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CHAPTER 12
The Enterprise, Labour and the Court of
Justice*
Jeff Kenner
12.1 INTRODUCTION
There is a palpable disconnect between the standard bi-dimensional model of
the employment relationship and the multidimensional mutations in contractual
arrangements and the organisation of enterprises in the early decades of the
twenty-first century.1 European Union (EU) labour laws, originating from
the 1970s, regulate the behaviour of the enterprise2 and its workers, reflecting
the standard model. Transnational labour regulations were drafted on the
assumption that both the enterprise and its workforce were easily identified,
were relatively static, were in a proximate physical space, and knew each other
directly, or at least indirectly through representatives of management and
labour. Over time, however, both enterprises and workers have become more
frangible as a consequence of the phenomena of globalisation, liberalisation and
* This Chapter is based on a presentation made at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice on 6 July
2015.
1. See Adalberto Perulli in the Introductory Chapter in this collection.
2. For the purposes of this Chapter, and to be consistent with the theme of the book, I have
used the term ‘enterprise’ generically, to include ‘an undertaking’, which may be public or
private, and also a ‘business’ or ‘firm’. See R. E. Allen (ed.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary
of Current English, 8th edn, 390 (Clarendon Press 1990). I also agree with Jean-Phillipe
Robé that a ‘multinational company’ is also an ‘enterprise’ because it is ‘an economic
organization that produces goods or services and which has structured its business
activities on the territory of numerous States’. See Jean-Phillipe Robé, Globalization and
Constitutionalization of the World Power System, in Jean-Phillipe Robé, Antoine Lyon-Caen
and Stéphane Vernac (eds), Multinationals and the Constitutionalization of the World-
Power System 11, 13 (Routledge 2016).
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privatisation. The standard enterprise model has undergone, what Hugh Collins
has described as ‘vertical disintegration’, under which managers of large firms
arrange, as a concerted strategy, ‘subcontracting, franchising, concessions and
outsourcing’ of aspects of production.3 Also, workspaces have become ‘de-
territorialised’ as workers, under contracts for services, become disconnected
and reconnected to national territory as labour markets integrate,4 heightening
concerns about, on the one hand, undercutting of labour standards or social
dumping and, on the other hand, undermining the bonds of social solidarity.
This process of transformation of the enterprise has been accelerated by
liberalisation of services and rules on the establishment of companies in the EU’s
single market, leading to regulatory competition between Member States,5 and a
drive by the European Commission, under the European semester process of
economic policy guidance,6 to encourage labour market reforms in a policy
climate that, as Catherine Barnard observes, prioritises ‘the economic over the
social’.7
As a consequence, EU labour law today simply does not fit with multidi-
mensional globalised systems of corporate organisation and contracting where
strategic decisions affecting continuing operations at subsidiaries or units of the
enterprise, situated in Europe, are taken unilaterally, often without informing
local management, and sometimes outside the territorial reach of EU regulation.
Indeed, it is often difficult to identify the employer. Is it the global corporation,
which may be domiciled outside the EU, or a group of enterprises linked by
complex and often opaque organisational arrangements designed to avoid tax
liabilities. Moreover, just as the decision-making processes of the enterprise
have changed, so too have the methods for deploying its workforce. As a result,
an increasingly diminishing core of workers fall under the protective umbrella of
EU labour law, while an ever growing contingent workforce of outsourced or
subcontracted labour, posted workers, agency workers, casual or on demand
‘zero-hour’ contract workers, or ‘gig’8 workers, have limited employment
3. Hugh Collins, Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to
Employment Protection Laws (1990) 10/3 OJLS 353, 353.
4. See Ines Wagner, Posted Work and Deterritorialization in the European Union: A Study of
the German Construction and Meat Industry (2015) Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychol-
ogy and Social Research 521, p. 26: https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/handle/123456789/45494
5. See Simon Deakin, Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe?
Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 323, March
2006: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/7151307.pdf.
6. See European Commission, ‘The European Semester’: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finan
ce/economic_governance/the_european_semester/index_en.htm
7. Catherine Barnard, EU Employment Law and the European Social Model: The Past, the
Present and the Future (2014) 67 Current Legal Problems 199, 204–205.
8. Workers in the ‘gig economy’ have individual contracts to work, when required, usually via
a mobile phone app. Examples include Uber taxis and Deliveroo drivers. See Will Hutton,
The Gig Economy Is Here to Stay. So Making It Fairer Must Be a Priority, The Guardian (4
September 2016).
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protection or none at all.9 Contingency, as Antonio Lo Faro observes, is
synonymous with the flexibility of both the enterprise and the worker, and, in its
most extreme form, the worker is ‘not part of the organisational and productive
“core” of the disintegrated ﬁrm’.10
This chapter addresses two specific issues arising from the transformation
of the relationship between enterprises and workers with reference to case law
of the Court of Justice of the EU (the Court). The first issue, discussed in Part
12.2, concerns the approach of the Court to interpreting and applying the
concepts of ‘employer’, ‘undertaking’ and ‘establishment’ in complex corporate
redundancy scenarios falling within the scope of the EU Collective Redundancies
Directive (CRD).11 It asks to what extent, if at all, in the light of this case law, the
Directive is effective in its aim of protecting workers in a variety of redundancy
contexts, such as strategic ‘downsizing’ decisions taken at the global or national
level of the enterprise or insolvencies leading to mass redundancies in multiple
local establishments.
The second issue, in Part 12.3, concerns the Court’s rulings on the validity
of national or local laws, or collective agreements, concerning terms and
conditions of employment in contracts, such as a requirement to pay the
applicable minimum wage, falling within the scope of EU directives on posted
workers and/or public procurement. In particular, the cases discussed concern,
mainly, the Posted Workers Directive (PWD), 96/71,12 which provides a guar-
antee for workers posted to the territory of a Member State of, inter alia,
minimum rates of pay as defined by law or applicable collective agreements,
and, secondly, the Public Procurement Directive, now Directive 2014/24, which
grants contracting authorities the right to lay down ‘special conditions’ relating
to the performance of a contract which may concern ‘social or employment-
related considerations’.13 In the context of both directives, any national measure
must be compatible with the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU.
Based on analysis of this case law, it asks, to what extent the relevant provisions
in these directives can be used to provide minimum protection for workers, both
core and contingent, and mitigate against the most harmful effects of social
dumping. Finally, Part 12.4, adds some concluding remarks.
9. See generally, Edoardo Ales, Olaf Deinert and Jeff Kenner (eds), Core and Contingent
Work in the European Union (Hart Publishing 2017).
10. Antonio Lo Faro, Contingent Work: A Conceptual Framework, in Edoardo Ales et al., ibid,
7–23, 8.
11. Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of
the Member States relating to collective redundancies, OJ L 225, 12.8.1998, 16–21.
12. Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ L 18,
21.1.1997, 1–6.
13. Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65-242,
Art. 70 (replacing Directive 2004/18, Art. 26).
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12.2 COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCIES
12.2.1 Analysis of the CRD
The EU CRD, 98/59,14 was first introduced as a crisis measure intended to
alleviate the consequences for workers of economic decline in the mid-1970s,
particularly in the private manufacturing sector where unemployment was
rising fast as factories closed.15 It was not intended to be interventionist.
According to the European Commission, closing down some companies was ‘an
integral part of the evolution towards more promising activities’.16 Ultimately
the decision of the management to close down an enterprise, or drastically
reduce the size of the workforce, is unfettered by the Directive. Instead, the
Directive, as amended, provides a mechanism for constructive dialogue between
the social partners to ensure that, where ‘collective redundancies’17 are contem-
plated by the employer in qualifying ‘establishments’, but the decision has not
yet been made to terminate employment contracts, a process is followed
whereby consultations begin with workers’ representatives ‘in good time with a
view to reaching an agreement’.18 Such an agreement should, at least, cover
‘ways andmeans of avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the numbers of
workers affected, and mitigating the consequences by recourse to accompany-
ing social measures’ such as redeployment or retraining.19 In order to enable
workers’ representatives ‘to make constructive proposals, the employers shall in
good time during the course of the consultations’ supply them with relevant
information including specific details notified in writing.20 It is only once the
‘employer’ is ‘contemplating’ redundancies that the procedural safeguards
14. Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to collective redundancies, OJ L 48, 22.2.1975, 29–30. See also,
Council Directive 92/56/EEC of 24 June 1992 amending Directive 75/129/EEC on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, OJ L
245, 26.8.1992, 3–5. The two directives were consolidated and replaced by Council
Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to collective redundancies, OJ L 225, 12.8.1998, 16–21.
15. See Jeff Kenner, EU Employment Law 28 (Hart Publishing 2003).
16. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum, 1972, reproduced in Bulletin No. 4,
Institute of Labour Relations, University of Leuven, 206 (1973).
17. Directive 98/59, Art. 1(1)(a) defines ‘collective redundancies’ as ‘dismissals effected by an
employer for one or more reasons not related to the individuals concerned’. The Court has
given a Union meaning to the concept of redundancy as ‘any termination of [a] contract of
employment not sought by the worker, and therefore without his consent’, Case C-55/02
Commission v. Portugal [2004] ECR I-9387, para. 50. For further discussion, see Catherine
Barnard, EU Employment Law, 4th edn, 630–642 (OUP 2012).
18. Directive 98/59/EC, Art. 2(1).
19. Ibid. Art. 2(2). Emphasis added.
20. Ibid. Art. 2(3). Under Art. 2(3)(b) the specified information includes: the reason for the
projected redundancies; the number and categories of workers to be made redundant by
reference also to the numbers normally employed; the period over which the projected
redundancies are to be effected; the criteria proposed for the selection of workers to be
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outlined above apply, introducing a subjective element into what is otherwise
meant to be an objective process.21
Each Member State is left with considerable freedom to apply the Directive
in a fashion that fits with their indigenous systems of labour law and industrial
relations.22 For example, Member States can choose between options for rules
governing the size of qualifying ‘establishments’ and the timescale of the
redundancies. These rules significantly limit the scope of the Directive. To count
as ‘collective redundancies’ for the purpose of the Directive, the minimum
number of redundancies relating to the size of the ‘establishment’ under Article
1(1)(a) is:
(i) Either, over a period of thirty days:
– at least ten in establishments normally employing more than
twenty and less than 100 workers;
– at least 10% of the number of workers in establishments normally
employing at least 100 but less than 300 workers;
– at least thirty in establishments normally employing 300 workers
or more;
(ii) or, over a period of ninety days, at least twenty, whatever the number
of workers normally employed in the establishments in questions.
Such flexibility demonstrates that the CRD ‘carries out only a partial
harmonisation of the rules for the protection of workers in the event of collective
redundancies’.23 Partial harmonisation allows for significant diversity in the
transposition of the Directive, as a minimum standards measure, including the
possibility of introducing ‘provisions which are more favourable to workers or to
promote or to allow the application of collective agreements more favourable to
workers’.24
An important feature of the Directive, as amended in the early 1990s, is a
transnational dimension whereby, under Article 2(4), the information and
consultation obligations are applicable ‘irrespective of whether the decision
regarding collective redundancies is being taken by the employer or by an
undertaking controlling the employer’. Also, it is not a defence on the part of the
employer that ‘the necessary information has not been provided to the employer
by the undertaking which took the decision leading to collective redundancies’.
The revised Article 2(4) was necessary to respond to ‘accelerating corporate
made redundant in so far as this is a requirement of national law and/or practice; and the
method for calculating any redundancy payments other than those arising out of national
law and/or practice.
21. See Barnard, supra n. 17, at 631.
22. Case C-383/92 Commission v. UK [1994] ECR I-2435.
23. Case C-44/08 Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto AEK ry and Others v. Fujitsu Siemens
Computers Oy [2009] ECR I-8163, para. 60.
24. Directive 98/59, Art. 5.
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restructuring’ arising from mergers and takeovers often involving enterprises
based outside the EU, but no further updating of the Directive has taken place
over a twenty-five-year period in which there has been exponential growth in
the power and influence of globalised enterprises using communication and
trade networks, to distribute products and services worldwide, often operating
outside the boundaries of State authority.25
The Directive contains a range of terms to describe the enterprise, or parts
thereof, specifically: ‘undertaking’; ‘controlling undertaking’; ‘establishments’;
and ‘employer’. Article 1, concerning definitions and scope, is silent on the
precise meaning of these terms. It is therefore left to the Court to interpret them
in the context of the Directive’s overarching aim, whereby ‘it is important that
greater protection should be afforded to workers in the event of collective
redundancies while taking into account the need for balanced economic and
social development within the [Union]’.26 Let us now turn to four cases that
illustrate the difficulty of this judicial task.
12.2.2 Case Law
In the first case, AEK v. Fujitsu Siemens Computers (‘AEK’),27 a reference from
the Supreme Court of Finland, the Court was asked to consider, for the first time,
the scope of the obligations under the Directive, including the revised Article
2(4), in a situation where the decision to close an undertaking was taken by the
board of directors of the undertaking’s parent company. The redundancies arose
following a merger between the computer businesses of Fujitsu and Siemens to
form a new parent group of companies, Fujitsu Siemens Computers (Holding)
BV (Netherlands). Following the merger, the board of directors of the parent
company, based in the Netherlands, accepted a proposal from the company’s
executive council to ‘disengage’ from a production plant in Finland. On the same
day, the local management of the parent company’s Finnish subsidiary, Fujitsu
Siemens Computers Oy, began a six-week period of consultations with the trade
unions at the plant. Immediately after this process was complete, the board of
the parent company took a final decision to terminate the company’s operations
in Finland with the exception of computer sales. Following this decision, the
Finnish subsidiary dismissed 450 out of 490 employees at the plant. The main
trade union at the plant, AEK, brought an action against the subsidiary claiming
that it had infringed its obligations under the Finnish law transposing the
Directive. It was argued that the parent company had separated the Finnish
factory from the company group and it had, alone, made the decision to close the
25. See especially, Robé, supra n. 2, at 11.
26. Directive 98/59, recital 2 of the preamble.
27. Case C-44/08 Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto AEK ry and Others v. Fujitsu Siemens
Computers Oy (hereinafter ‘AEK’)[2009] ECR I-8163.
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factory. The national court asked a series of questions which can be distilled into
three core questions, with subquestions, summarised below.28
Firstly, what is the meaning of the expression ‘is contemplating redundan-
cies’ so as to determine the time at which the obligation to hold consultations
starts? Is the obligation to start consultations triggered when the strategic
decision to make collective redundancies is finally made or at an earlier stage at
which a need for collective redundancies is expected?29
In its answer, the Court emphasised the temporal application of the
Directive. The obligations of consultation and notification become operative
when there is an intention to make ‘projected’ collective redundancies but prior
to the employer’s decision to actually terminate employment contracts.30 This
means that the notification by the employer is not a fait accompli but rather it is
the commencement of a process under which there is a possibility of avoiding or
at least reducing collective redundancies, or mitigating the consequences.31
Once the employer has contemplated collective redundancies, or has a plan for
them, the information and consultation obligations are triggered.32 In the
specific context of the case, the effect of the revised Article 2(4), concerning
decisions taken by controlling undertakings, is to trigger the obligation to hold
consultations ‘where the prospect of collective redundancies is not directly the
choice of the employer’33 and ‘even though the employer may not have been
immediately and properly informed of that decision’.34 Applying Article 2(4),
therefore, ensures, in the context of ‘an economic background marked by the
increasing presence of groups of undertakings’, there is ‘greater protection for
workers in the event of collective redundancies’ in situations where there is a
controlling undertaking.35 It followed that, for this objective to be fully effective,
‘the consultation procedure must be started by the employer once a strategic or
commercial decision compelling him to contemplate or to plan for collective
redundancies has been taken’.36
Secondly, in a case involving a group of undertakings, does the obligation
to start consultations on the collective redundancies contemplated arise even
28. For the full set of questions see, AEK, para. 30.
29. AEK, para. 36.
30. AEK, paras 38–40, referencing Directive 98/59, Arts 2(1) and 3(1). See further, Case
C-188/03 Junk [2005] ECR I-885, paras 36–37.
31. AEK, para. 38.
32. AEK, para. 41. See Case 248/83 Dansk Metalarbejderforbund and Specialarbederforbundet
i Danmark [1985] ECR 553, para. 17.
33. AEK, para. 42.
34. AEK, para. 43.
35. AEK, para. 44, referencing recital 2 of the preamble cited above. See Case C-270/05
Athinaïki Chartopoïïa [2007] ECR I-1499, para. 25.
36. AEK, para. 48.
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before the employer is able to supply all the required information to the workers’
representatives?37 Also, when is the consultation procedure to be concluded?38
In reply, the Court explained that the process is designed to be flexible, to
ensure that even if the subsidiary, the ‘employer’, did not have all the required
information at the start of consultations it would be possible to provide it ‘during
the course of the consultations’39 and ‘to enable the workers’ representatives to
participate in the consultation process as fully and effectively as possible and, to
achieve that, any new relevant information must be supplied up to the end of the
process’.40 For the purposes of Article 2(4), ‘the decision’ has been taken by the
parent company and it is obliged to provide the necessary information to
the employer under its control so that the latter can fulfil the information,
consultation and notification obligations.41 Therefore, the obligation to start
consultations does not depend onwhether the employer is already able to supply
the workers’ representatives with the necessary information concerning, inter
alia, the reasons for the projected redundancies, the number of redundancies,
and the period over which they are to be effected.42 Also, the employer must
fulfil all of the consultation obligations in the Directive before any decision on
the termination of contracts is taken.43
Thirdly, should the obligation to start consultations arise when the em-
ployer or the parent company, which controls the employer, is contemplating
collective redundancies and, in order for the obligation to start consultations to
arise, must the subsidiary, within which the redundancies are contemplated, be
identified?44
The Court’s answer was very specific. Under the scheme of the Directive
only the employer, who is in an employment relationship with the workers, has
the obligation to inform, consult and notify.45 The fact that the parent undertak-
ing controls the employer, even if it can take decisions which are binding on the
employer, does not make it the employer.46 As the Directive provides only partial
harmonisation it does not restrict the freedom of a group of undertakings to
organise their activities in a fashion that best suits their needs.47 It followed, as
a specific consequence of the introduction of Article 2(4), that the Finnish
subsidiary, as the immediate ‘employer’ of the workers in the ‘establishment’,
could not escape from its obligations under the Directive simply because the
decision to disengage from the plant was taken by the parent company. Because
37. AEK, para. 50.
38. AEK, para. 66.
39. AEK, paras 52–53.
40. AEK, para. 53.
41. AEK, EU:C:2009:241, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, para. 40.
42. AEK, judgment, para. 55, with reference to Art. 2(3)(b) of Directive 98/59.
43. AEK, paras 66–72, applying Case C-188/03 Junk [2005] ECR I-885, para. 45.
44. AEK, para. 56.
45. AEK, para. 57.
46. AEK, para. 58.
47. AEK, paras 59–60. See also Case C-449/93 Rockfon, EU:C:1995:420, para. 21.
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the employer was part of a group of undertakings, the Court ruled, it was
compelled to contemplate redundancies and initiate the consultation procedure,
whether or not it had prior knowledge of the decision of the parent or controlling
undertaking.48 It is for this reason that it is not possible to start the consultations
until the subsidiary has been identified.49
In its ruling in AEK, the Court demonstrated a strongly purposive reading of
the scope of the CRD, specifically the gap-filling Article 2(4). The judgment
recognises that the underlying teleology of the Directive, as amended, is to afford
greater protection to workers in the event that collective redundancies are
contemplated in situations where restructuring decisions are taken at the central
headquarters of the parent enterprise, wherever it is located.50 The provisions of
the Directive are effective even where those decisions have been taken without
the direct involvement, or even knowledge, of the subsidiary that is the
immediate employer of the workers being made redundant. Nevertheless,
deeming the subsidiary, once it has been identified, to be contemplating
redundancies in situations where ‘the decision’ is unexpected and the subsidiary
has little or no knowledge of the plan, is unlikely to lead to meaningful local
consultations with workers’ representatives. Although an obligation can be
inferred on the parent company making ‘the decision’, that obligation is only
valid between the parent company and the subsidiary, it does not affect the
obligation to hold consultations which remains the responsibility of the subsid-
iary as ‘employer’.51 The employer may be able to supply the required informa-
tion, at least during ‘the course of the consultations’, or even up to the end of the
consultations,52 but there is no corresponding obligation on the real decision-
maker, the central undertaking, to participate in the consultations. Even if the
reasons for the restructuring or closure decision are provided to the subsidiary,
so long as it conducts the consultations in good faith and provides all the
necessary information over the applicable timetable, the minimum requirements
of the Directive will have been met without the subsidiary, as ‘the employer’,
being able, in practice, to take any significant steps to avoid or reduce the
redundancies or otherwise ameliorate their effects.
Three further cases on the scope of the CRD, decided in quick succession by
the Court in the spring of 2015, each concerned the meaning of the terms
‘establishment’ or ‘establishments’, for the purpose of calculating the threshold
and the time period for the number of redundancies to qualify as ‘collective
redundancies’, depending on the option chosen by the Member State concerned
under Article 1(1)(a). These cases also highlight the potential for broader
48. AEK, para. 62.
49. AEK, para. 63.
50. Although the restructuring decision was taken in another Member State, there is no
territorial limit to Art. 2(4) and nothing in the judgment to suggest that the ruling would
have been any different if the parent company had been located in a third country.
51. AEK, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, para. 40.
52. AEK, judgment, para. 65.
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protection of workers in Member States that choose to make use of Article 5 of
the Directive, by introducing laws, regulations or administrative provisions, or
allow the application of collective agreements, that are ‘more favourable’ to
workers.
The first two cases, from the United Kingdom, Lyttle53 and USDAW and
Wilson,54 concerned redundancies arising as a consequence of mass closures of
retail stores after the owners had been declared insolvent. In both cases the
central issue was whether each individual store was an ‘establishment’, for the
purpose of calculating the threshold of ‘at least 20’ redundancies over a period of
ninety days, to fall within the definition of ‘collective redundancies’ under
Article 1(1)(a)(ii), see above, the option chosen by the UK under its implement-
ing legislation.55
In Lyttle, Bluebird UK Bidco 2 (‘Bluebird’), had taken over the ownership of
Bonmarché following the insolvency of the previous owners. At the time when
the business was transferred in January 2012, Bonmarché had 414 clothing
stores in the UK employing around 4,200 workers. In the spring of 2012 Bluebird
carried out a redundancy programme, reducing the number of stores to 273 with
approximately 3,000 employees. The claimants, Ms Lyttle and others, worked at
four different branches of Bonmarché in Northern Ireland each of which had
fewer than twenty workers. The stores where they had been working were
closed and the redundancies took effect in March 2012. It was not disputed that
the redundancy consultation did not satisfy the requirements of the Directive.
USDAW and Wilson concerned the insolvency of the high street chains
Woolworth and Ethel Austin in 2011. By contrast with Lyttle, there was a total
liquidation of the businesses without a transfer of ownership leading to closure
of all the stores and several thousand redundancies. In stores that had employed
twenty workers or more, protective awards were made by the UK Secretary of
State in accordance with the national legislation applicable where the employer
has failed to comply with the requirements of the Directive.56 However, 4,500 of
the redundant workers, who had been working in stores employing fewer than
twenty workers, were denied a protective award on the ground that each of
those stores was a separate ‘establishment’ and therefore below the threshold
for ‘collective redundancies’. Ms Wilson, one of those affected, and her trade
union, USDAW, contended that the dismissed workers at all the Woolworth and
Ethel Austin stores were within the scope of the Directive and were entitled to
protective awards on the basis that the stores, collectively, were ‘establishments’
for the purpose of Article 1(1)(a)(ii).
53. Case C-182/13 Valerie Lyttle and Others v. Bluebird UK Bidco 2 Limited, EU:C:2015:317,
referred from the Industrial Tribunals (Northern Ireland) – hereinafter Lyttle.
54. Case C-80/14 Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW), B Wilson v. WW
Realisation 1 Ltd, in liquidation, Ethel Austin Ltd, Secretary of State for Business,
Innovation and Skills, EU:C:2015:291, referred from the Court of Appeal (England and
Wales) – hereinafter USDAW and Wilson.
55. The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s. 188(1).
56. Ibid. s. 189(3), transposing Directive 98/59, Art. 6.
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In each case, therefore, the crux of the issue raised in the questions referred
to the Court, was either whether the term ‘establishments’ referred to the whole
of the retail business, which should be treated as a single economic unit that was
contemplating mass redundancies, or did it refer only to the particular units or
stores to which the workers concerned had been assigned their duties? If the
answer was the former, the protective awards would be payable to all workers
dismissed in the course of the same restructuring exercise, irrespective of the
size of the store at which they had worked.57
In separate judgments, which were essentially identical on the main issues,
the Court followed its previous case law on the scope of ‘establishment’ in
Article 1(1)(a)(i), the alternative option to the one chosen by the UK. In
Rockfon,58 a Danish case concerning the scope of Article 1(1)(a)(i), the Court
had held that, as the term ‘establishment’ is not defined in the Directive, it must
be interpreted autonomously and uniformly in the EU legal order and cannot,
therefore, be defined independently in the laws of the Member States.59 It
followed that the term ‘establishment’ is defined by reference to the ‘employ-
ment relationship’ of the individual workers which is ‘essentially characterised
by the link existing between the worker and the part of the undertaking or
business to which he is assigned to carry out his duties’.60 From this perspective,
the term ‘establishment’ in Article 1(1)(a) ‘must be interpreted as designating …
the unit to which the workers made redundant are assigned to carry out their
duties’.61 Based on the Court’s narrow view of an ‘establishment’ it is not
necessary that ‘the unit in question is endowed with a management that can
independently effect collective redundancies’.62 According to the Court, an
‘establishment’ is a ‘distinct entity’ from an ‘undertaking’ if the undertaking has
several units each ‘having a certain degree of permanence and stability, which is
assigned to perform one or more given tasks and which has a workforce,
technical means and a certain organisational structure allowing for the accom-
plishment of those tasks’.63 The meaning of the term ‘establishment’ was
57. See Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, EU:C:2015:68, para. 47. The Advocate General’s
Opinion was issued for all three cases under consideration: Lyttle, USDAW and Wilson,
and Case C-392/13 Andrés Rabal Cañas v. Nexea Gestión Documental SA and Fondo de
Garantia Salarial (discussed below).
58. Case C-449/93 Rockfon, EU:C:1995:420.
59. Lyttle, para. 26, USDAW and Wilson, para. 45, applying Case C-449/93 Rockfon,
EU:C:1995:420, para. 25 and Case C-270/05 Athinaïki Chartopoïïa AE v. L Panagiotidis
and Others, EU:C:2007:101, para. 23.
60. Lyttle, para. 28, USDAW and Wilson, para. 47, applying Case C-449/93 Rockfon,
EU:C:1995:420, para. 32.
61. Lyttle, para. 28, USDAW and Wilson, para. 47.
62. Lyttle, para. 28, USDAW and Wilson, para. 47.
63. Lyttle, paras 30–31, USDAW and Wilson, paras 49–50, applying Case C-270/05, ibid,
para. 27.
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identical regardless of which option the Member State had chosen under Article
1(1)(a). The two options were ‘substantially equivalent’ alternatives.64
The Court noted that the provisions of Directive 2002/14/EC, establishing
a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the EU, contain
a clear distinction between the terms ‘undertakings’ and ‘establishments’.65
Under that Directive an ‘undertaking’ is ‘a public or private undertaking carrying
out an economic activity, whether or not operating for gain, which is located
within the territory of the Member States’,66 whereas an establishment is ‘a unit
of business defined in accordance with national law and practice’.67 In Directive
2002/14, therefore, the term ‘establishment’ is not given an autonomous and
uniform meaning unlike the term ‘undertaking’. Large retailers, of the size of
Bonmarché and Woolworths/Ethel Austin before insolvency, with a single
owner, would fall within the very broad definition of ‘undertaking’ in that
Directive. If, as the Court had already asserted in both Lyttle and USDAW and
Wilson, an ‘undertaking’ covers ‘all the separate employment units of the
undertaking’,68 it is legitimate to suggest that the term ‘establishments’, plural,
used in Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 98/59, is the same as ‘undertaking’. The
Court dismisses the use of the term ‘establishments’ in Article 1(1)(a), which is
in, inter alia, the English, French, Italian and Spanish versions of the Directive,
on the basis that the singular term ‘establishment’ is used in some language
versions and the latter is deemed to preclude equating an ‘establishment’ with
an ‘undertaking’.69 This is rather odd as it could, conversely, be suggested that
the use of ‘establishments’ in several language versions, specifically, in context
of Article 1(1)(a)(ii), which refers to ‘the number of workers normally employed
in the establishments in question’,70 points to the opposite interpretation. Unlike
Directive 2002/14, the CRD makes no distinction between ‘undertakings’ and
‘establishments’ and, it is submitted, to include all workers in the undertakings’
‘establishments’ in the calculation of the number of redundancies in situations
where redundancies are contemplated across multiple units of the enterprise, is
more consistent with the protective aim of the Directive and should therefore be
preferred.
64. Lyttle, para. 37, USDAW and Wilson, para. 56.
65. Lyttle, para. 50, USDAW and Wilson, para. 69. Directive 2002/14/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for
informing and consulting employees in the European Community – Joint declaration of the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on employee representation, OJ
L80, 23.03.2002, 29–34.
66. Directive 2002/14, Art. 2(a).
67. Directive 2002/14, Art. 2(b). Emphasis added.
68. Lyttle, para. 47, USDAW and Wilson, para. 66.
69. Lyttle, para. 36, USDAW and Wilson, para. 55. Advocate General Wahl, at para. 53 of his
Opinion, points to the Croatian, Danish, German, Finnish, Hungarian and Swedish
versions.
70. Directive 98/59, Art. 1(1)(a)(ii).
Jeff Kenner
210
What is remarkable is how the Court’s very specific Union definition of
‘establishment’ in Lyttle and USDAW and Wilson has had the effect of excluding
large numbers of workers from protection under the Directive in a situation
where a single enterprise, or its administrator, is contemplating the dismissal of
hundreds or, in the case of Woolworths and Ethel Austin, thousands of workers
simultaneously. The only difference between these mass dismissals and a
similar number of dismissals that might occur in a redundancy scenario in a
single large factory, such as the Fujitsu Siemens plant in AEK, arises from the
particular organisation of the retail trade into multiple store units.
According to the Court, the fact that, theoretically, an inclusive approach
might cover a single worker of an establishment, would be contrary to the
ordinary meaning of the term ‘collective redundancy’.71 This argument is
erroneous because, even if there had only been a single worker in one of the
stores, that worker would have been made redundant by a decision taken by
central management of the enterprise to make all, or a substantial proportion of
the workforce, redundant, providing a collective dimension. Ultimately, in both
Lyttle and USDAW and Wilson, all the redundancies had been contemplated by
central management and put into effect nationwide. It is difficult to rationalise
how an interpretation, which has such inequitable effects between identically
situated workers employed in different-sized stores, is justified.
In explaining its reasoning, the Court recognised that an erga omnes
interpretation of the concept of ‘establishment’ to cover all affected workplaces
within the undertaking and treat them as a single entity, would have signifi-
cantly increased the number of workers eligible for protection, corresponding
with one of the objectives in the Directive of affording greater protection to
workers.72 According to the Court, however, the objective of worker protection
in the event of collective redundancies must be balanced with a need ‘to ensure
comparable protection for workers’ rights in different Member States and to
harmonise the costs which such protective rules entail for EU undertakings’ and
thus ‘rendering comparable the burden of those costs in all Member States’.73
None of these arguments is convincing. The logical approach would be to
apply the same interpretation of ‘establishments’ to all Member States, regard-
less of which option in Article 1(1)(a) applies, so as to include the total number
of redundancies across all establishments of an enterprise where these are
effected as part of a single management plan. It would also ensure comparable
protection of workers in enterprises contemplating redundancies regardless of
whether the workforce is in single or multiple locations. It might entail different
costs for enterprises, depending on the method chosen to carry out consulta-
tions, but this would be a natural consequence of the organisation of the
enterprise and does not justify inequitable treatment of the workforce. An
inclusive interpretation would also be consistent with the Directive’s core aim,
71. Lyttle, para. 45, USDAW and Wilson, para. 64.
72. Lyttle, para. 42, USDAW and Wilson, para. 61.
73. Lyttle, paras 43–44, USDAW and Wilson, paras 62–63.
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which not only affords greater protection to workers in the event of collective
redundancies, but also takes account of ‘the need for balanced economic and
social development’.74 It would protect small businesses, or indeed autonomous
franchises of retail chains, with fewer than twenty workers, whomake their own
decisions, and would be outside the scope of the Directive whichever option in
Article 1(1) is chosen.75
Finally, the Court suggests that it would have been open to the UK to
introduce ‘more favourable’ provisions under Article 5 in order to extend
protection ‘to all workers affected by redundancy in an undertaking or part of an
undertaking of the same employer, the term “undertaking” being understood as
covering all the separate employment units of that undertaking or that part of an
undertaking’.76 It would have been possible to lay down more favourable rules
without affecting the ‘autonomous and uniform’ interpretation given to the term
‘establishment’.77 It is submitted that this is the wrong approach. The main
purpose of EU social policy harmonisation is to extend the basic guarantee of
directives as widely as possible to achieve a common standard,78 which should,
under the CRD, encompass all those affected by large scale redundancies
initiated by an enterprise as part of a single plan. It should then be left to some
Member States, who have chosen to avail themselves of the ‘more favourable’
provisions to workers, to improve the quality of protection when collective
redundancies are contemplated by, for example, introducing more stringent
rules to improve the quality of the information and consultation process and
introduce more effective remedies.
The third case, Rabal Cañas,79 referred from a Spanish court, concerned
redundancies made by Nexea, an undertaking providing hybrid email services
which formed part of a group of undertakings owned by the Spanish State.
Nexea had two establishments: an administration department and production
site in Madrid with 164 employees, and an operations centre in Barcelona with
twenty employees. Although the Barcelona site was an extension of Nexea’s
Madrid operation carrying out substantially identical tasks, it did have its own
manager. Following losses in 2011, and the forecast of further losses in 2012,
Nexea gradually carried out dismissals at both locations from August 2012,
reducing the number of workers employed at its Barcelona site to 16 by
December 2012. At that point it decided to close its operation in Barcelona
leading to the dismissal of Mr Rabal Cañas and twelve other workers on
economic grounds.
74. Directive 98/59, recital 2 of the preamble.
75. Consistent with Art. 153(2)(b) TFEU.
76. Lyttle, para. 47, USDAW and Wilson, para. 66.
77. Lyttle, para. 48, USDAW and Wilson, para. 67.
78. See Kenner, supra n. 15, at 30–31 and Brian Bercusson, European Labour Law (Butter-
worths, 1996) 52.
79. Case C-392/13 Andrés Rabal Cañas v. Nexea Gestión Documental SA and Fondo de
Garantia Salarial, EU:C:2015:318.
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Spain’s implementing legislation was, on the one hand, apparently more
favourable to workers because it used ‘undertaking’ rather than the ‘establish-
ment’ as the sole reference unit but, on the other hand, it was more restrictive,
limiting the concept of collective redundancies to particular types of termination
based on ‘economic, technological, organisational or production grounds’.80
Spanish lawwas somewhat aligned with the option in Article 1(1)(a)(i) but there
were differences. The definition of ‘collective redundancies’ included, termina-
tions, over a period of ninety days, affecting, inter alia, at least ten workers in
undertakings employing fewer than 100 workers, or 10% of the workers in
undertakings employing between 100 and 300 workers. It was argued by Mr
Rabal Cañas that, at the time of his dismissal, the total number of dismissals over
a period of ninety days was eighteen which amounted to 10% of the total
personnel of the undertaking and therefore the threshold had been met for
‘collective redundancies’ under the national legislation. Conversely, the Spanish
Government contended that the national legislation had to be interpreted
consistently with the options in Article 1(1)(a)(i) and (ii), which required there
to be at least twenty workers in ‘establishments’ for the dismissals to be deemed
collective redundancies. By using the latter formulation, and treating the Barce-
lona site as an ‘establishment’, the threshold had not been met.
In its judgment, the Court addressed the question of whether the national
legislation, which used only the undertaking as the reference unit, was compat-
ible with the Directive. Applying its previous case law, including the recently
decided Lyttle and USDAW and Wilson cases, the Court was satisfied that
Nexea’s operation in Barcelona was an ‘establishment’ as distinct from an
‘undertaking’.81 Having deemed it an ‘establishment’, the Court, without any
further reasoning, accepted the argument of the Spanish Government that there
had to be a minimum of twenty workers for the dismissals to count as ‘collective
redundancies’.82 It appears, therefore, that the expression ‘more favourable’
provisions under Article 5 does not extend to lowering the threshold even
though this would have benefited the workers concerned. On the central point
behind the reference, the Court observed that replacing the term ‘establishment’
with ‘undertaking’ could be regarded as more favourable to the workers
concerned, and thus compatible with the Directive, but only if it did not mean
that the protection afforded to workers is lost or reduced.83 It followed that
national legislation was incompatible with the Directive if it had the effect of
precluding the information and consultation procedure provided for in the
Directive, when the dismissals would have been considered ‘collective
80. ‘Law on the Workers’ Statute’, Art. 51(1).
81. Rabal Cañas, para. 51.
82. Rabal Cañas, para. 55.
83. Rabal Cañas, para. 52.
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redundancies’ under the definition in Article 1(1)(a), had the establishment
been used as the reference unit.84
Rabal Cañas highlights continuing difficulties with the Court’s interpreta-
tion of the Directive in the context of restructuring. Nexea had chosen to
establish an outreach operation in Barcelona when it was expanding its busi-
ness. When the economic climate became more difficult, it was able to gradually
reduce its workforce in Barcelona in stages and ultimately shut down the site
over a period beyond the maximum ninety days stipulated in Article 1(1)(a),
keeping below the threshold and thereby avoiding any obligations under the
Directive. It would not have been able to avoid those obligations if it had
slimmed down its staffing in Madrid instead of closing down its operation in
Barcelona. If the Court had, instead, applied a literal interpretation of the
national legislation, by treating Nexea as a single ‘undertaking’, the dismissals in
Barcelona would have been subject to the national rules on information and
consultation. The Spanish legislation was rather sloppily drafted and involved
some ‘cherry picking’85 but it is somewhat contrary for the Court to suggest, in
Lyttle and USDAW and Wilson, that the UK had the option of widening
protection for workers, by using the freedom offered by Article 5 to introduce
‘more favourable’ provisions for workers, but then to proceed, in Rabal Cañas,
to override Spain’s exercise of its ‘right’86 to introduce such provisions. The
Court is correct in its desire to ensure that national legislation should not be
interpreted in such a way as to deny workers the protection afforded by the
Directive but this theoretical problem only arose because of its own narrow
interpretation of the language contained therein.
12.2.3 Ways Forward
In the example of the CRD, partial harmonisation has led to a degree of
convergence in the laws of the Member States but there is significant differen-
tiation in protection arising from the choice of model for calculating and timing
of redundancy decisions and the use of more favourable provisions to widen the
scope of protection for workers in redundancy situations. As outlined above, the
underlying purpose of EU regulation is not to question the employer’s rationale
for contemplating redundancies but rather to offer a process of information and
consultation that may lead, after negotiations on constructive proposals from
workers’ representatives, to a rethink or at least a less unpalatable plan. The
CRD, operating within a very narrow window, offers the prospect of a less harsh
outcome, but only for those workers coming within its scope.
84. Rabal Cañas, para. 57.
85. Rabal Cañas, para. 57.
86. Directive 98/59, Art. 5. Emphasis added.
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When the CRD was amended in the 1990s it extended its arc of coverage to
‘cases where the redundancy decision is taken by a decision-making centre or an
undertaking located in another Member State’.87 Recognising that transnational
restructuring was becoming increasingly common, arising in part by mergers of
enterprises within the single market, the revised CRD ‘eliminated’ a loophole.88
In AEK,89 case analysis has shown that the Court met this basic challenge by
upholding the revised Article 2(4) to ensure that workers were protected
notwithstanding the fact that the decision taken to dismiss them was made by
central management located in another Member State. The outcome of the case
is, nevertheless, unsatisfactory because the full obligation for transmitting
information and conducting consultations lies with local ‘establishment’ of the
‘undertaking’. Formally the information and consultation requirements can be
met, but the ‘establishment’ or ‘employer’ may have its hands tied and be able
to offer little to ameliorate the scale or impact of the redundancies. Any
improvements offered must be sanctioned by the central management at arms-
length from the consultation process. It is submitted that the CRD should be
amended to ensure that, where the employer is unable to effectively negotiate on
proposals from workers’ representatives, in line with the protective aims of the
CRD, responsibility should be placed on the shoulders of the real decision-
maker, the central management, to conduct the consultations.
In Lyttle90 and USDAW and Wilson,91 analysis demonstrates that the
Court’s adoption of a rigid formula for the concept of an ‘establishment’, to give
this term a uniform meaning, has led to inequality of protection for otherwise
identically situated workers made redundant, collectively, as a consequence of
the transfer or liquidation of the enterprise after insolvency. By treating each unit
of the organisation as a micro ‘establishment’ the CRD, as interpreted by the
Court, allows for restructuring plans to be based on divide and rule, and worse
still those who work in the units below the threshold of twenty workers can
be excluded altogether. It is submitted that this runs contrary to the purpose of
the Directive, not least language used at the time of restructuring that recognised
that key corporate decisions are taken at a higher level than the place where the
worker is employed, all pointing to a need for flexibility to ensure that where
87. European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 75/129/EEC on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies’,
COM(91) 292 final, 3.
88. Ibid.
89. Case C-44/08 Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto AEK ry and Others v. Fujitsu Siemens
Computers Oy [2009] ECR I-8163.
90. Case C-182/13 Valerie Lyttle and Others v. Bluebird UK Bidco 2 Limited, EU:C:2015:317.
91. Case C-80/14 Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW), B Wilson v. WW
Realisation 1 Ltd, in liquidation, Ethel Austin Ltd, Secretary of State for Business,
Innovation and Skills, EU:C:2015:291.
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mass redundancies are being contemplated by the central management across
multiple sites of the enterprise within one or more Member States, the total
number of employees in the combined ‘establishments’ of the ‘undertaking’ are
brought with the umbrella of protection. At the very least, in order to escape
from the inflexible meaning given to ‘establishment’ by the Court, the CRD
should be revised to leave the definition to ‘national law and practice’ as is the
case with the Framework Directive on Information and Consultation of Employ-
ees, 2002/14.92 This approach would also ensure that workers in situations
similar to those in the Spanish case, Rabal Cañas,93 would be counted at both
establishments, towards the threshold, although this could have been achieved
by recognising the approach of Spain as a ‘more favourable’ provision.
To conclude on the CRD, it is necessary to carry out a further revision to
ensure that its mechanisms are more robust. The Commission’s proposed
‘European Pillar of Social Rights’,94 contains references to the need for adequate
compensation in the event of dismissal and strengthened involvement of
workers in enterprises. It is necessary to convert this initiative into an EU-wide
basis for reviewing labour law. An important reference point is Article 27 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU which, as EU primary law,95 provides
that workers or their representatives must ‘at the appropriate level, be guaran-
teed information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the
conditions provided by Union law and national laws and practices’. The Court
has taken a restrictive approach to the interpretation of Article 27 in AMS,96
ruling that it cannot be relied on by a private party in a dispute with another
private party, limiting its use to the public sector. It is noticeable that Article 27
has not featured in the cases under discussion in this Chapter. In the absence of
any prospect of judicial activism by the Court, it is submitted that EU law falls
short of offering the guarantee promised by Article 27 and this should now be
addressed.97
92. Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002
establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European
Community – Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commis-
sion on employee representation, OJ L80, 23.03.2002, 29–34, Art. 2(b).
93. Case C-392/13 Andrés Rabal Cañas v. Nexea Gestión Documental SA and Fondo de
Garantia Salarial, EU:C:2015:318.
94. European Commission, ‘Towards a European Pillar of Social Rights’, 14 September 2015:
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/
towards-european-pillar-social-rights_en.
95. Treaty on European Union, Art. 6(1).
96. Case C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale v. Union locale des syndicats CGT,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2.
97. See further, Filip Dorssement, ‘Article 27’, in Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner &
Angela Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary 749 (Hart
2014).
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12.3 POSTED WORKERS, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND ‘FAIR
COMPETITION’ IN THE EU’S SINGLE MARKET
12.3.1 The Posted Workers Directive
Although the PWD, 96/71,98 has its roots in EU social policy99 it operates within
the framework of the provision of services in the Union’s single market,100 an
ambiguity that has caused problems regarding both the perception of its
essential purpose and the scope of its application to enterprises and labour. By
the mid-1990s, services were rapidly liberalising. The dynamism of the single
market had encouraged enterprises ‘to develop their transnational activities and
increasingly to provide transnational services’.101 In turn, transnational services
had led to transnational employment relationships and a deterritorialisation of
labour law, raising questions about the best method of protecting workers
posted temporarily to another Member State to perform work under a service
contract and prevent social dumping so as to ensure fair competition in the
single market.
Under the Rome Convention of 1980, and now the Rome I Regulation,102
the presumption is that the employment contract is governed by the law of the
country in which the employee habitually carries out his work, even if he is
temporarily employed in another country,103 but it permits ‘overriding
mandatory provisions’ to be applied by the receiving country under certain
98. Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ L 18,
21.1.1997, 1–6.
99. The source of the Directive is the draft of the European Community Charter of the
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, COM(89) 248, point 3. See Kenner, supra n. 15,
at 138. At the time of its adoption, unanimity would have been required to adopt it as a
social policy measure. Unanimity was not possible because the United Kingdom and
Portugal were opposed. The legal bases for the Directive are TFEU Arts 53 and 62,
relating to free movement of services, which only require a qualified majority vote in the
Council of the EU. See further, Jonas Malmberg, Posting Post Laval – International and
National Responses, Uppsala Center for Labor Studies, Working Paper 2010:5, 6. (2010).
100. Recital 4 of the preamble of Directive 96/71 explains that ‘the provision of services may
take the form either of performance of work by an undertaking on its account and under
its direction, under a contract concluded between the undertaking and the party for
whom the services are intended, or of the hiring-out of workers for use by an
undertaking in the framework of a public or private contract’.
101. European Commission, The Implementation of Directive 96/71/EC in the Member States,
COM(2003) 458 final 4.
102. Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, 6–16.
For discussion, see Catherine Barnard, The UK and Posted Workers: The Effect of
‘Commission v. Luxembourg’ on the Territorial Application of British Labour Law, 38 ILJ
122 (2009).
103. Directive 96/71, Art. 8(2).
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conditions.104 In particular, if labour conditions, such as wages and working
hours, are less advanced in the home country of the posted worker by compari-
son with the host country, the practice of posting, in an environment of
liberalised services, will inevitably cause social dumping by undercutting.
Indeed, as early as 1988, the Commission anticipated downward pressure on
social conditions because of the demands of competition in the single market
with a particular intensification of social dumping expected in areas such as
public works contracts, construction and transport.105 This was precisely the
issue that arose in Rush Portuguesa,106 a case involving Portuguese construction
workers posted temporarily to France to perform a service contract, in which the
Court made it possible, but not obligatory, for France, as host, to extend labour
law rules, including provisions in collective agreements, to posted workers.107
The PWD seeks to address this problem by making obligatory the applica-
tion by the host Member State of certain terms and conditions of employment to
posted workers with the aim of providing ‘a climate of fair competition and
measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers’.108 The PWD applies
horizontally to undertakings established in any Member State that posts workers
to another Member State.109 It includes three types of posting by undertakings:110
(a) posting workers directly under a contract concluded between the
undertaking and the party for whom the services are intended;
(b) posting to an establishment or an undertaking owned by the group;
and
(c) posting by a temporary employment or posting agency.111
In each case the posted worker must have an employment relationship
with the undertaking or agency. Additional provisions to identify genuine
104. Directive 96/71, Art. 9.
105. European Commission, The Social Dimension of the Internal Market, Social Europe,
Special Ed., 65–66 (1988).
106. Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa Ldª v. Office national d’immigration, EU:C:1990:142.
107. See Barnard, supra n. 17, at 218; Kenner, supra n. 15, at 15.
108. Directive 96/71, recital 5 of the preamble.
109. Directive 96/71, Art. 1(1). Under Art. 1(4) undertakings established in a non-member
State must not be given more favourable treatment than undertakings established in a
Member State.
110. Directive 96/71, Art. 1(3).
111. Also, under Directive 96/71, Art. 3(9), Member States can choose to extend the principle
of equal treatment between temporary agency workers and workers of the user
undertaking to posted agency workers. In practice this would mean that the rights of
posted agency workers in those Member States would be equivalent to those provided
by Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 Novem-
ber 2008 on temporary agency work, OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, 9–14.
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posting and prevent abuse and circumvention of the Directive can be found in
the subsequent Posted Workers Enforcement Directive adopted in 2014.112
In its core provisions, the PWD sets out a framework for the coordination
of laws of the Member States ‘in order to lay down a nucleus of mandatory rules
for minimum protection to be observed in the host country by employers who
post workers to perform temporary work in the territory of a Member State
where the services are provided’.113 These ‘hard core’114 rules, must be intro-
duced by law and/or, in the case of activities involving building work,115 by
means of certain types of collective agreement or arbitration award,116 to provide
a ‘guarantee’ for ‘posted workers’117 of terms and conditions of employment118
under Article 3(1) covering, inter alia:119
112. Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on
the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the
framework of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2012 on
administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI
Regulation’), OJ L 159, 28.5.2014, 11–31.
113. Directive 96/71, recital 13.
114. Directive 96/71, recital 14.
115. Defined in the Annex of Directive 96/71 as including ‘all building work relating to the
construction, repair, upkeep, alteration or demolition of buildings’ and certain particu-
lar types of building work listed therein.
116. Directive 96/71, Art. 3(8). In some Member States collective agreements or arbitration
awards can be made ‘universally applicable’, which means that they ‘must be observed
by all undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or industry con-
cerned’. Alternatively, if a Member State does not have such a system, there are two
alternatives for them to base their rules on. First, collective agreements or arbitration
awards must be ‘generally applicable to all similar undertakings in the geographical area
and in the profession or industry concerned’ and/or, second, ‘collective agreements
which have been concluded by the most representative employers’ and labour organi-
sations at national level and which are applied throughout national territory’. Both of
these alternatives must apply to all the undertakings covered by the Directive and must
ensure ‘equality of treatment’, meaning the same obligations between national under-
takings and posting undertakings in a similar position as regards the matters listed in
Art. 3(1) and also a requirement ‘to fulfil such obligations with the same effects’.
117. Directive 96/71, Art. 2(1) defines a ‘posted worker’ as ‘a worker who, for a limited
period, carries out his work in the territory of a Member State other than the State in
which he normally works’. Under Art. 3(6) the length of the posting shall be calculated
on the basis of a reference period of one year from the beginning of the posting.
118. Social security coordination is excluded. It is covered by Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of
social security systems, OJ L 166, 30.04.2004, 1–123.
119. Directive 96/71, Art. 3(1). Under Art. 3(3), if the posting is for less than one month, the
provisions on work periods, rest periods and holidays can be waived by Member States,
after consulting management and labour. Under Art. 3(5), it is possible to have an
exemption from those provisions for a longer period on the grounds that the work to be
done is not significant. Also, under Art. 3(4), if the posting is for less than one month it
is possible to waive the provision on minimum rates of pay but only by means of a
collective agreement as defined in Art. 3(8). These derogations do not apply to posted
agency workers.
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(a) maximum work periods and minimum rest periods;
(b) minimum paid annual holidays;
(c) minimum rates of pay defined by national law and practice of the host
Member State;120
(d) the conditions of hiring-out workers, in particularly the supply of
workers by temporary employment undertakings;
(e) health, safety and hygiene at work;
(f) protective measures with regard to the terms and employment of
pregnant women or women who have recently given birth, of children
and of young people;
(g) equality of treatment between men and women and other provisions
on non-discrimination.
Also, under Article 3(10), Member States, are not precluded from applying
Treaty compatible terms and conditions of employment on matters not listed in
Article 3(1) either by means of ‘public policy provisions’ or, in the case of
activities other than building work,121 by collective agreements or arbitration
awards that meet criteria laid down in Article 3(8).122 Such an extension of scope
must be based on equality of treatment between national undertakings and
undertakings of other Member States.123 Finally, Article 3(7) ‘shall not prevent’
Member States applying terms and conditions of employment which are ‘more
favourable’ to workers.
By contrast with social policy measures, the PWD coordinates but does not
harmonise minimum standards for workers within its scope.124 This reflects the
fact that it was adopted on the basis of Treaty provisions concerned with the
coordination of service provision.125 In the absence of harmonisation, there have
been significant variations in implementation, such as, differential approaches
to the use of laws to put into the effect the mandatory terms and conditions, the
application of collective agreements for this purpose, introducing ‘more favour-
able provisions’, and including terms and conditions on other matters as public
policy provisions.126 Differentiation has caused particular problems of interpre-
tation for enterprises, social partners and the courts.
120. Under Directive 96/71, Art. 3(7) allowances specific to the posting shall be considered
part of the minimum wage, unless they are paid in reimbursement of expenditure
actually incurred on account of the posting, such as expenditure on travel, board and
lodging.
121. As defined in the Annex, see supra n. 104.
122. See supra n. 116.
123. Directive 96/71, Art. 3(10).
124. See Barnard, supra n. 17, at 221.
125. TFEU Arts 53(1) and 62.
126. European Commission (n. 90) 8–9. European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal
Policies, Posting of Workers Directive – current situation and challenges: STUDY for the
EMPL Committee, June 2016, IP/A/EMPL/2016-07 PE 579.001, 9.
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An additional factor, when considering the cases discussed below, is the
competing visions of two broad groups of Member States: those who are the
main recipients of posted workers, who tend to favour strong regulation; and
those who are exporters of posted workers, who are seeking market access for
their services. Also problematic has been the ‘framework of services’ context
which provides the point of reference for the Court when it seeks to reconcile the
‘inherent tension’ within the PWD between ‘a free relatively unrestricted
cross-border provision of services, and guaranteeing a means with which to
meet the objectives related to the social protection of posted workers’.127 The
next part offers analysis on selected case law of the Court in which it has had to
address the ‘regulatory balance’ between these perhaps incompatible prin-
ciples.128 Also important are related cases where liberalisation of services, as a
result of the application of EU public procurement rules, has increased the use of
posted workers, or the transfer of jobs from one Member State to another. In
such cases there is a complex interaction between provisions in the EU’s Public
Procurement Directive, now 2014/24, which allow for contract compliance in
public works contracts concerning, inter alia, ‘social and employment-related’
considerations,129 and the PWD, where the point of reference is only the ‘hard
core’ terms and conditions.
12.3.2 Case Law
12.3.2.1 Laval, Commission v. Luxembourg and Rüffert: Preventing or
Promoting Social Dumping?
In the short period from December 2007 to June 2008 the Court delivered a
trilogy of powerful judgments – Laval,130 Commission v. Luxembourg,131
Rüffert132 – that collectively demonstrate that the Court mainly views the PWD
through the lens of free movement of services and not labour law. Indeed,
following these cases, the PWD is so constrained in its application that, in its
present form, and in isolation, it offers very limited potential to be used by the
host Member State to prevent social dumping and may even be promoting it.
127. European Parliament, ibid, 9.
128. Ibid. 21.
129. Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65–242,
Art. 70 (replacing Art. 26 of Directive 2004/18).
130. Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet,
EU:C:2007:809.
131. Case C-319/06 Commission v. Luxembourg, EU:C:2008:350.
132. Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, EU:C:2008:189.
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Any discussion of the Court’s case law on the PWD has to begin with
Laval,133 a reference from the Swedish Labour Court issued by the Grand
Chamber as a Christmas surprise on 18 December 2007. It is a case that has come
to symbolise the free movement of services versus labour rights conundrum and
when, ultimately, liberalised services won out, it led to demands to strengthen
the PWD that continue to reverberate to this day.
Laval is mainly known, along with Viking,134 its sister case on freedom of
establishment, for its restrictive approach to the rights of trade unions to engage
in collective action to resist the posting of workers on lower terms and conditions
of employment than workers of the home Member State and other forms of
social dumping.135 For the purposes of this chapter, however, the main focus is
on the extent to which national norms, including those derived from collective
agreements, can be used to minimise differences between posted workers and
workers of the host Member State or even to equalise labour standards.
Laval is a textbook case on the complex challenges of regulating the law on
posted workers in the context of strongly contested single market rules on
opening up public works’ contracts for building work. It pitted the laws and
industrial relations traditions of Sweden, a Member State mainly receiving
posted workers, against the laws of Latvia, a mainly posting Member State that
had recently joined the Union.136 Swedish legislation implementing the Directive
did not fix minimum rates of pay for posted workers and had no express
provisions concerning the application of the terms and conditions in collective
agreements in respect of building work. This approach reflected the Swedish and
wider Nordic model of labour law in which as much autonomy as possible is left
to management and labour to negotiate their own legally binding agreements.
Laval was a Latvian company that posted workers to Sweden to work on
building sites operated by a Swedish company. Laval had signed a collective
agreement with a Latvian construction union setting, inter alia, levels of pay.
The posted workers were paid about 40% less than comparable Swedish
workers who were covered by the national collective agreement for the con-
struction sector.137 Over a six-month period, Laval was responsible for a contract
to build a school. The Swedish trade unions sought to extend the domestic
collective agreement to Laval’s workers. This collective agreement included not
only rates of pay but also, inter alia, a ‘special building supplement’ to pay for
insurance. One of the Swedish unions, Bygettan, threatened industrial action
directed against Laval if they did not agree to a wage level for the workers based
133. Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet,
EU:C:2007:809.
134. Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union
v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, EU:C:2007:772.
135. Such as the reflagging of ships in Viking, ibid.
136. Latvia joined the EU on 1 May 2004. Sweden had joined the EU nearly a decade earlier in
1995.
137. See Barnard, supra n. 17, at 223.
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on Bygettan’s estimate of average wages in the sector. When these negotiations
were unsuccessful, the unions instigated a blockade of the building site that,
when followed by sympathy action, made it impossible for Laval to perform the
contract. The police would not intervene, as the industrial action was lawful
under Swedish law. Eventually the workers returned to Latvia. Laval brought an
action before the Swedish Labour Court seeking compensation directly from the
unions for the damage suffered.
The central question referred to the Court was whether it is compatible
with the freedom to provide services and the PWD for trade unions to attempt,
by means of collective action, to force a foreign provider of services to sign a
collective agreement in the host country with respect to terms and conditions of
employment. In its reply, the Court emphasised that Member States have
discretion to freely define the content of the ‘hard core’ of mandatory rules so
long as their rules are compatible with EU law.138 In the case of Sweden, the
requirements in Article 3(1) regarding minimum rates of pay for posted workers
were not laid down either by national law or an applicable collective agreement,
and yet the dispute revolved around a requirement imposed on Laval to
negotiate with trade unions on wage levels and to sign a collective agreement.
Referring to Article 3(8), concerning collective agreements, the Court noted that
it is possible for national rules in the construction sector to be based on rules that
are ‘generally applicable’ to all similar undertakings in the industry concerned,
covering the matters listed in Article 3(1), but this approach must be based on
equality of treatment between national undertakings and undertakings that post
workers from abroad.139 The position was, therefore, quite different in Sweden
from certain other Member States that have national laws or universally
applicable collective agreements that guarantee such equality of treatment. In
the absence of such provisions, the Court reasoned, Swedish law might still
comply with the PWD so long as it did not hinder the provision of services
between Member States.140 Article 3(1), however, only refers to minimum rates
of pay, but what the trade unions were seeking to impose was the whole
framework of the Swedish system for pay in the sector. Because the minimum
rates of pay were not determined by Swedish law, and the attempt to extend the
collective agreement was applicable only to Laval and not to other undertakings
in the construction sector, the Court concluded that Articles 3(1) and 3(8) did not
entitle Sweden to impose wage negotiations on individual undertakings.141
Next the Court turned to the general aim of the Directive to provide for a
‘climate of fair competition’ between national undertakings and undertakings
that provide services transnationally. According to the Court, the rules in Article
3(1), in relation to terms and conditions of employment, prevent service
providers that post workers from other Member States from competing unfairly
138. Laval, para. 60.
139. Laval, paras 65–66.
140. Laval, para. 68.
141. Laval, para. 71.
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against undertakings of the host Member State if the level of social protection in
the host Member State is higher.142 The workers concerned can then enjoy those
better terms and conditions in the host Member State. However, the Court ruled
that the provision in Article 3(7) allowing for ‘more favourable’ terms cannot be
interpreted as allowing the host Member State to make the provision of services
in its territory ‘conditional’ on the observance of terms and conditions of
employment ‘which go beyond the mandatory rules for minimum protection’ in
Article 3(1).143 The Court proceeded to crystallise a new test that effectively
boxes in Article 3(1) and (7) to protect service providers as follows:144
the level of protection which must be guaranteed to workers posted to the
territory of the host Member State is limited, in principle, to that provided for
in [Article 3(1)(a)-(g)], unless, pursuant to the law or collective agreements in
the Member State of origin, those workers already enjoy more favourable
terms and conditions of employment as regards the matters referred to in that
provision.
Article 3(7) is not, therefore, a weapon that can be used to prevent social
dumping. Moreover, the public policy exception in Article 3(10) could not be
called in aid either. Sweden had not had recourse to it in its implementing
legislation and therefore it was not possible to include matters such as the
insurance supplement because it had chosen to leave this to management and
labour. The social partners are not bodies governed by public law and hence the
trade unions could not avail themselves of that provision by citing grounds of
public policy in order to maintain collective action.145
The Court proceeded to address collective action from the perspective of EU
single market law. Emphasising that the free movement of services guarantee is
one of the fundamental principles of EU law, the Court held that collective action
by trade unions was a restriction on free movement that could only be warranted
if it pursues a legitimate objective compatible with the treaties and is justified by
overriding reasons of public interest.146 The Court recognised that the right to
take collective action for the protection of host State workers against ‘possible
social dumping may constitute an overriding reason of public interest’, namely
the protection of the interests of workers, which, if exercised proportionately,
was capable of justifying a restriction on the free movement of services.147
However, having adopted a restrictive approach to the scope of Article 3(1), the
Court concluded that the collective action, specifically the blockade, had been
taken for the purpose of forcing a provider of services established in another
Member State to enter into negotiations with the Swedish union on rates of pay
for posted workers and to sign a collective agreement, the terms of which laid
142. Laval, para. 75.
143. Laval, para. 80.
144. Laval, para. 81.
145. Laval, paras 82–84.
146. Laval, para. 101.
147. Laval, para. 105.
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down more favourable conditions than those resulting from the relevant legis-
lative provisions, while other terms, such as the insurance supplement, related
to matters not referred to in Article 3(1). Also, Sweden had not activated Article
3(10) to extend the scope of protection. The Court held that, even though the
trade unions were private parties, the form of collective action they had taken
was precluded by both Article 56 TFEU and the PWD and could not be
objectively justified.148 Bizarrely the trade union could be held responsible for
the impact of their collective action on free movement of services as though they
were akin to a public body but, for the purposes of Article 3(10), as outlined
above, they could not make ‘public policy’ even in a system that granted them
autonomy to negotiate legally binding norms.
In its ruling in Laval, the Court took an extremely restrictive and, in many
ways, unbalanced view of the protective provisions of the PWD vis-à-vis free
movement of services. As a coordination rather than harmonisation measure,
the PWD leaves considerable flexibility for host Member States to apply the ‘hard
core’ rules in a fashion that fits with their own system of labour law and
industrial relations with a view to ‘guaranteeing respect for the rights of
workers’.149 Sweden, in accordance with the traditions of its system, had
abstained from detailed regulation in order to allow for collective bargaining
and, subject to certain restrictions, collective action was lawful. In this regard,
the Court’s restrictive approach to Article 3(7) and (10), provisions that might
allow for stronger and wider protective employment measures, is problematic.
Undoubtedly, the method of collective action in Laval, its impact on the
enterprise and the workers concerned, and the breadth of equal treatment that
the trade union was seeking, made this a hard case for the Court, which had, as
its main reference point, the Union’s fundamental economic freedoms. It would
have been open for the Court to uphold the Swedish method of flexible
implementation of the PWD and interpret Article 3 more broadly so as to avoid
interfering with its labour law system, but still find that the method chosen by
the unions was a disproportionate exercise of their members’ right to take
collective action.150 Instead, as Catherine Barnard observes, the Court ‘came
close to making Article 3(1) not a floor but a ceiling’.151 So long as the ‘hard core’
of mandatory rules’ is applied by the host Member State there is deemed to be no
unfair competition. Hence, as Jonas Malmberg notes, ‘the idea of equal treat-
ment of domestic and foreign service providers has been rejected in favour of a
principle of minimum protection’.152
Before Laval it would perhaps seem obvious for a Member State to simply
extend its domestic labour laws or applicable collective agreements to posted
workers en bloc so as to cover the areas included in Article 3(1) and other
148. Laval, para. 111.
149. Directive 96/71, recital 5.
150. Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU, Art. 28.
151. Barnard, supra n. 17, at 224.
152. Malmberg, supra n. 99, at 8.
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‘matters’ concerning terms and conditions of employment under the first indent
of Article 3(10), as ‘public policy provisions’ on the basis that if such measures
are compatible with EU law and ensure equality of treatment between home and
host Member State undertakings, those other ‘matters’ are not precluded.153 An
all-embracing approach would provide consistency for all service providers and
workers based on comprehensive equal treatment under labour law and would
prevent social dumping. This was essentially the method of implementation
adopted by Luxembourg, which relied primarily on Article 3(10),154 as the basis
for extending the whole body of its labour law, including collective agreements,
to posted workers as ‘mandatory provisions falling under national public
policy’.155 However, this broad method of implementation was contested by the
Commission in an infringement action, Commission v. Luxembourg,156 seeking
to have the Luxembourg law declared invalid on the grounds that it went beyond
the mandatory rules for ‘minimum protection’ in Article 3(1) and would, in
practice, put service providers from other Member States, who would be
unfamiliar with Luxembourg law, at a disadvantage, amounting to a discrimi-
natory restriction on the free movement of services. Luxembourg contended that
its labour laws were, collectively, provisions of ‘public policy’ that ensured
equality of treatment between undertakings falling within the exception permit-
ted by Article 3(10). The Commission countered that the notion of public policy
could not be used by a Member State to unilaterally impose all mandatory
provisions of its employment law.
In its judgment the Court went even further than it had in Laval in its strict
approach to the scope of Article 3(1) by proclaiming that it ‘sets out an
exhaustive list of the matters in respect of which the Member States may give
priority to the rules in force in the host Member State’.157 This is somewhat
incongruous given the reference in Article 3(10), first indent, to Member States
not being precluded from adopting laws based on equality of treatment between
undertakings, concerning terms and conditions of employment ‘onmatters other
than those’ referred to in Article 3(1) ‘in the case of public policy provisions’,
which, in the light of the context of the PWD, relate to the protection of workers’
interests. Luxembourg’s case was that the body of its national labour law was
‘public policy’ by reference to what is now Article 9(2) of the Rome I Regulation,
153. Luxembourg’s case was not helped by additional rules requiring a prior notification
procedure for certain types of posting and also requiring documents necessary for
monitoring purposes to be retained by an ad hoc agent registered in Luxembourg. It was
inevitable that such a rule would be found likely to inhibit service providers from other
Member States and be contrary to TFEU Art. 56. See Case C-319/06 Commission v.
Luxembourg, EU:C:2008:350, paras 75–84.
154. Luxembourg also declared laws resulting from collective agreements to be universally
applicable under Art. 1 of the Law of 20 December 2002, Commission v. Luxembourg,
para. 4.
155. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 4.
156. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 4.
157. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 26.
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which authorises ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ of national law superseding
the contract law of the home Member State.158 The term ‘overriding mandatory
provisions’ is defined in Article 9(1) of that Regulation as ‘provisions the respect
for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests,
such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they
are applicable to any situation falling within their scope’.159
This argument did not help Luxembourg. The Court interpreted the first
indent of Article 3(10) and the derogation in Article 9(2) of the Regulation as
having an essentially identical application. This was not surprising as the Court’s
own previous case law in Arblade,160 on the meaning of the ‘public policy’
exception to free movement of services,161 was the basis for the text of Article
9(1) of the revised Regulation.162 The Court applied Arblade directly by recalling
its dictum that ‘public-order legislation’ applies to ‘national provisions compli-
ance with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the
political, social or economic order in the Member State concerned as to require
compliance therewith by all persons present on the national territory of that
Member State and all legal relationships within that State’.163 According to the
Court, it followed that the term ‘public policy’, located in an EU legislative act
within the framework of the provision of services, was ‘a derogation from the
fundamental principle of freedom to provide services which must be interpreted
strictly, the scope of which cannot be determined unilaterally by the Member
States’.164 In light of the above, as the first indent of Article 3(10) is a derogation
from the principle that the matters to be covered by laws and/or applicable
collective agreements in the Member States are set out in the exhaustive list in
Article 3(1), it must be interpreted strictly.165
In support of this interpretation the Court made express reference to
Declaration No 10 on Article 3(10) of the Directive, which was recorded in the
minutes of the Council of the EU as follows:166
The Council and Commission stated: ‘the expression ‘public policy provi-
sions’ should be construed as covering those mandatory rules from which
there can be no derogation and which, by their nature and objective, meet the
158. See supra n. 102.
159. Ibid.
160. Case C-369/96 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils
SARL and Case C-376/96 Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL, EU:C:1999:575.
161. TFEU Arts 62 and 52(1).
162. See Barnard, supra n. 17, at 230.
163. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 29, applying Arblade, supra n. 160, at para. 30.
164. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 30, applying Case C-503/03 Commission v. Spain
[2006] ECR I-1097.
165. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 31. The Court also found, at para. 65, that, to the
extent that Art. 3(10) could be applied, provisions concerning collective agreements
could fall under the definition of ‘public policy’.
166. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 31.
Chapter 12: The Enterprise, Labour and the Court of Justice
227
imperative requirements of the public interest. These may include, in particu-
lar the prohibition of forced labour or the involvement of public authorities in
monitoring compliance with legislation on working conditions.
This Declaration has no formal legal status and was not published in the
EU’s Official Journal. As a unilateral declaration of intent, it is best described as
a travaux préparatoires given formal recognition by these institutions at the final
legislative stage.167 In recent years, travaux préparatoires have become an
increasingly important part of the Court’s approach to interpretation, in particu-
lar in cases where the documentation is publicly accessible and there is a clear
statement of intent.168 With regard to a declaration of this kind, the Court has
previously held that such declarations can be excluded where no reference is
made to the content of the declaration in the wording of the provision in
question.169 Nevertheless, the Advocate General observed that, in his opinion,
notwithstanding the lack of a reference to the Declaration in the text of the
Directive, it is ‘in conformity with the case-law developed by the Court on the
inherent limits on the fundamental freedoms which are also applicable to cases
of transnational posting of workers’170 and, on this basis, it was admissible as an
aid to interpretation. It is submitted that, in the absence of publication and
express reference, this is an extremely shaky basis for such strong reliance by the
Court and it has the potential to further shrink the scope for application of the
first indent of Article 3(10). Moreover, the Court made no reference to recital 34
of the Rome I Regulation which makes express reference to the overriding
mandatory provisions of the country to which workers are posted in the context
of the PWD.171 This implies that labour law provisions should be capable of
falling within the scope of ‘public policy’ under the first indent of Article 3(10)
indicating, at the very least, that the provision should be interpreted on a case by
case basis and recital 34 should be taken into account.
Next the Court addressed a requirement in Luxembourg law relating to the
automatic adjustment of rates of remuneration to the cost of living. Increasing
the minimum wage by the cost of living fell squarely within ‘minimum rates of
pay’ in Article 3(1)(c) but the indexation concerned all wages including those
167. See Eur-Lex, ‘Preparatory acts’: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/pre-acts.
html
168. Koen Lenaerts, José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, To Say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of
Interpretation and the European Court of Justice, AEL 2013/9, Working Paper (Academy
of European Law, European University Institute) 19–24: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bit
stream/handle/1814/28339/AEL_2013_09_DL.pdf
169. Commission v. Luxembourg, Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, EU:C:2007:516,
para. 45, citing: Case 429/85 Commission v. Italy [1988] ECR 843, para. 9; Case
C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745, para. 18; Case C-329/95 VAG Sverige [1997] ECR
I-2675, para. 23; and Case C-368/96 Generics (UK) and Others [1998] ECR I-7967, paras
25 to 28.
170. Commission v. Luxembourg, judgment, para. 45.
171. The recital states that: ‘The rule on individual employment contracts should not
prejudice the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the country to which
a worker is posted in accordance with Directive 96/71’. See further, Barnard (n. 17) 232.
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above the minimum wage.172 Once again the Court’s reading was very strict. It
found that the intention of the EU legislature was to limit intervention of Member
States on the minimum rates of pay. It followed that the automatic adjustment of
rates of pay other than the minimum wage fell outside the scope of Article
3(1)(c). The Court was not prepared to countenance any intention on the part of
the Member States to allow for an interpretation of ‘minimum rates of pay’ that
did not equate with the national or sectoral ‘minimum wage’, effectively
lowering the ceiling further on Article 3(1). In a similar vein the Court found
separately that rules governing equal treatment for part-time and fixed-term
workers did not fall within Article 3(1) as these matters were not specifically
listed therein, notwithstanding that there is a reference in Article 3(1)(g) to
‘other provisions on non-discrimination’.173
Also, the wage indexation or living wage requirement could not be saved as
a ‘public policy’ provision under the first indent of Article 3(10). Luxembourg
had sought to justify it as aimed at ensuring ‘good labour relations’ and, on that
basis, constituting a public policy imperative by protecting workers from the
effects of inflation.174 However, the Court took an even narrower view of ‘public
policy’ noting that while Member States are, in principle, ‘free to determine the
requirements of public policy in the light of national needs, the notion of public
policy in the [EU] context … may be relied on only if there is a genuine and
sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society’.175 As Catherine
Barnard has observed, this test is based on case law on justifications for
deporting EU citizens ‘transplanted … to the very different context of labour
law’.176 Such an ‘extraordinarily high standard’, she adds, would perhaps only
cover laws against slavery, referred to in Declaration No 10, and would be likely
to exclude laws on, inter alia, freedom of association and collective bargaining,
data protection and possibly even elimination of exploitative forms of child
labour and forced labour.177
Moreover, the reasons invoked by a Member State to justify utilising the
public policy exception must be accompanied by appropriate evidence or
analysis of the expediency and proportionality of the measure in question and
precise evidence to substantiate its position.178 In this case, the Court found that
Luxembourg had put forward generalised justifications, ‘without adducing any
evidence to enable the necessity for and the proportionality of the measures
adopted to be evaluated’.179 The Court held that this defence was insufficient to
satisfy the strict requirements of the public policy exception.180
172. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 45.
173. Commission v. Luxembourg, paras 54–55. See Barnard’s critique, supra n. 17, at 233.
174. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 48.
175. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 50.
176. Barnard, supra n. 17, at 232.
177. Ibid. 232–233.
178. Commission v. Luxembourg, paras 50–51.
179. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 53.
180. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 55.
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Finally, the Court addressed the use of collective agreements as ‘public
policy provisions’ under the first indent of Article 3(10). The Court found that
Luxembourg’s approach was too wide-ranging. Although provisions in collec-
tive agreements could fall under this provision, it could not be used to apply the
body of national collective agreements in their entirety.181 Also, Luxembourg
could not rely on the second indent of Article 3(10) as an alternative because this
only applied to collective agreements that were ‘universally applicable’ which
means, under Article 3(8), that they must be observed by all undertakings in all
sectors,182 which was not the case.183
The next case, Rüffert,184 was the first of several challenges to social clauses
contained in public procurement laws of German states and cities. The dispute
arose when Lower Saxony awarded a contract to build a prison to Objekt und
Bauregie (OuB) subject to a requirement in the tender that they must pay at least
theminimumwage to construction workers pursuant to the collective agreement
in force in the building and public works sector. OuB used a subcontractor based
in Poland to carry out the work. After an investigation, the contract was
terminated on the grounds that OuB had failed to fulfil its contractual obligation
to comply with the collective agreement on the grounds that fifty-three posted
workers on the building site were being paid less than 50% of the minimum
wage laid down in the collective agreement.
The single question before the Court was, in essence, whether the require-
ment, when submitting tenders for building contracts, to pay at least the
remuneration prescribed by the collective agreement in force at the place where
those services were performed, amounted to an unjustified restriction on the
freedom to provide services contrary to Article 56 TFEU?185
Even though the question was silent on the subject of posted workers, the
Court decided that it was necessary to take the PWD into consideration because
the subject matter fell within the scope of Article 1(3)(a) concerning the posting
of workers, who are in an employment relationship with an undertaking, to a
host Member State directly under a contract concluded between that undertak-
ing and the party for whom the services are intended.186 The fact that Lower
Saxony’s legislation was not intended to govern the posting of workers did not
preclude a situation coming within the scope of the PWD.187 Having established
the locus of the case under the PWD, the next issue was to determine the status
of the collective agreement, which was the means used to ‘fix’ the ‘minimum
rates of pay’ as a guaranteed term and condition applicable to the posted
181. Commission v. Luxembourg, paras 64–65.
182. See supra n. 116.
183. Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 67.
184. Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, EU:C:2008:189.
185. Rüffert, para. 16.
186. Rüffert, paras 18–19.
187. Rüffert, para. 20.
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workers.188 In accordance with the second indent of Article 3(1), which concerns
activities in the building work sector, it was necessary for this purpose for the
collective agreement to be declared ‘universally applicable’ as defined in Article
3(8).
As the Court noted, there are two means by which a collective agreement
can be regarded as ‘universally applicable’ under Article 3(8). Under the first
subparagraph, ‘universally applicable’ collective agreements or arbitration
awards are those that must be observed by all undertakings in the geographical
area and in the profession or industry concerned.189 Under the second subpara-
graph, in the absence of a system for declaring collective agreements to be of
universal application, the possibility exists to base them on collective agree-
ments or arbitration awards that are ‘generally applicable’ to all similar under-
takings in the profession or industry concerned or agreements that have been
concluded by themost representative employers’ and labour organisations at the
national level and are applied throughout the national territory.190
It was therefore necessary to establish whether the rates of pay had been
fixed in accordance with one of these procedures. In relation to the first
procedure, the national law implementing the PWD extended the application of
provisions on minimum wages in collective agreements, which had been
declared universally applicable, to employers established in other Member
States which had posted workers to Germany. However, the collective agree-
ment referring to Lower Saxony’s law had neither been declared universally
applicable, nor was their evidence that it was capable of being treated as such.191
With regard to the second procedure, the Court held that it applies only where
there is no system for declaring collective agreements to be of universal
application, which was not the case in Germany.192 In any event it would not
have fallen within that procedure because it was not ‘generally applicable’,
because its binding effect covered only part of the construction sector falling
within the geographical area of the agreement as it only applied to public
contracts.193 As the collective agreement did not meet either of these require-
ments it could not be used to impose the rate of minimum pay on undertakings
established in other Member States.194
With Article 3(1) precluded, the only fall back appeared to be Article 3(7),
allowing for ‘terms and conditions of employment which are more favourable
for workers’. This was a possibility instantly rejected by the Court, which
explained that, having already found the rate of pay set under the collective
188. Rüffert, para. 21. The Court also noted, at para. 24, that the regional legislation on the
award of public contracts did not, of itself, fix the minimum rates of pay and therefore it
was not a ‘law’ within the meaning of the first indent of Directive 96/71, Art. 3(1).
189. Rüffert, para. 21.
190. Rüffert, para. 22.
191. Rüffert, paras 25–27.
192. Rüffert, para. 28.
193. Rüffert, para. 29.
194. Rüffert, paras 30–31.
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agreement to be outside Article 3(1), the ‘more favourable’ clause could not be
used to impose it as a condition on providers of services from other Member
States.195 The host Member State is not ‘entitled’ to require undertakings to
observe a degree of protection for workers beyond the matters listed in Article
3(1).196 It would be different, however, if undertakings established in another
Member State were to sign, of their own accord, a collective agreement in a host
Member State the terms of which were more favourable.197
Making reference again to the ceiling imposed in Laval, the Court reiterated
that, with the exception of the unusual instance of more favourable provisions
emanating from the home Member State, there was no prospect ‘in principle’ of
using Article 3(7) to enhance the minimum protection offered by Article
3(1)(a)–(g).198 The point of ‘principle’ being economic – the rights of transna-
tional services providers to unencumbered market access – ahead of the social,
protection of the interests of workers both posted and domestic. Indeed, the
Court went further, stating that the law of Lower Saxony was so restrictive on
service providers from Member States where levels of pay were lower, that it
‘may impose … an additional economic burden that may prohibit, impede or
render less attractive the provision of their services in the host Member State’. It
followed that ‘it cannot be considered to be justified by the objective of ensuring
the protection of workers’. In these few words the Court in Rüffert, far from
preventing social dumping, has effectively endorsed it, in the form of levelling
down wages, as a price worth paying for opening of public work contracts and
liberalising the market.
Finally, the Court took a direct swipe at the whole concept of ethical clauses
in public works contracts citing a lack of evidence to support a policy applying
such clauses solely to public contracts.199 It made no mention of the EU public
procurement rules because, on the facts, the situation was confined to the
posting of workers.200 It also found that such a restrictive measure could not be
supported by the arguments put forward by Lower Saxony based on, firstly,
protecting independence in the organisation of working life by trade unions, and
secondly, ensuring the financial balance of social security systems, which are
dependent on the level of wages, as an overriding interest.201
Rüffert, along with Laval and Commission v. Luxembourg, represent,
collectively, an unwarranted intrusion into the autonomy of domestic labour law
systems that have evolved as part of the social consensus in Member States at
195. Rüffert, para. 35.
196. Rüffert, para. 33, applying Laval para. 80.
197. Rüffert, para. 34.
198. Rüffert, para. 34, applying Laval, para. 81.
199. Rüffert, para. 40.
200. Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds), Social and Environmental Policies in EC
Procurement Law Introduction, 6 (Cambridge 2009). For further analysis on this point,
see Aristea Koukiadaki, The Far-Reaching Implications of the Laval Quartet: The Case of
the UK living Wage (2014) 43 International Law of Jouranl 91, 101.
201. Rüffert, paras 41–42.
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national, regional and sectoral levels. It is remarkable, and perhaps ironic, that
whereas the social policy provisions in the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) require that EU measures must ‘take account of the
diverse form of national practices, in particular in the field of contractual
relations’,202 the free movement of services provisions, as the source of the
Directive, have been applied as a blunt instrument by the Court, supported by
the Commission, to Europeanise those social policy practices and relations that
are regarded as restrictive. This logic applies even in cases where the measures
are introduced for social reasons, such as guaranteeing the minimum wage, but
the impact on posted workers is incidental. In its response to Rüffert, the
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) remarked that the judgment was
an ‘open invitation for social dumping, which will not only threaten workers’
rights and working conditions but also the capacity of local (small and medium)
enterprises to compete on a level playing field with foreign (sub)contractors’.203
Rüffert has had a significant impact on the system of public procurement
favoured by many federal states in Germany and more widely throughout the
Union.204 The extent to which it is a problem depends on the national system.
For example, in Finland, the national law on employment contracts, which is
declared as ‘universally applicable’, places an obligation on employers to
observe the provisions of a national collective agreement considered represen-
tative in the sector in question on the terms and conditions of the employment
relationship including a minimum wage to be paid to posted workers. In the
subsequent Finnish case, ESA,205 the relevant collective agreement for construc-
tion workers in the electricity sector, which included a minimum wage for
posted workers, was found by the Court to be ‘universally applicable’ within the
meaning of the second indent of Article 3(1) and Article 3(8), and therefore
Rüffert could be distinguished.
The Finnish approach does not fit with the German constitutional system,
which favours decentralisation to the federal state level. Detlef Sack points to
three reforming responses in Germany.206 First, several federal states have
abolished state-specific contract compliance laws. Second, other federal states,
including Lower Saxony, have amended their laws, in line with the Court’s
jurisprudence, to ensure that these laws are consistent with the ‘hard core’ of
protection in the PWD. Third, certain federal states have repackaged their
202. TFEU, Art. 151.
203. ETUC, ‘Rüffert case: ETUC warns that ECJ’s judgement is destructive and damaging’
(Press Release, 3 April 2008): https://www.etuc.org/press/rüffert-case-etuc-warns-ecj’s-
judgement-destructive-and-damaging.
204. See Detlef Sack, ‘Europeanization Through Law, Compliance, and Party Differences –
The ECJ’s ‘Rüffert’ Judgment (C-346/06) and Amendments to Public Procurement Laws
in German Federal States’ (2012) 34/3 European Integration 241.
205. Case C-396/13 Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry v. Elektrobudowa Spolka Akcyjna (ESA),
EU:C:2015:86.
206. Sack, supra n. 204, at 253.
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contract compliance requirements to fit with the regime of EU public procure-
ment. It is to the third of these responses that I shall now turn with reference to
two recent cases referred from German courts that highlight the interplay
between the laws on posted workers and public procurement.
12.3.2.2 Bundesruckerei and RegioPost: Posted Workers and Public
Procurement – Tilting the Balance Towards the Social?
Public procurement as a concept encompasses ‘the purchasing by government
from private sector contractors, usually on the basis of competitive bidding, of
goods and services that government needs’.207 The EU public procurement
regime provides minimum harmonised rules for the purchase of services, works
and supplies by public authorities whose monetary value exceeds a specified
European-level threshold in order to create a level playing field for all enterprises
across the Union.208 By means of the public procurement rules, the EU seeks,
inter alia, to facilitate better use of public procurement through strategic use of
public contracts and promote participation of small and medium-sized enter-
prises. It therefore recognises the important contribution of public authorities in
driving forward the single market programme. The relevant instrument appli-
cable at the time of the two cases discussed in this section was Directive 2004/18
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public work contracts, public
supply contracts and public service contracts.209 Directive 2004/18 has now
been repealed and replaced by Directive 2014/24.210 Under Article 1 of Directive
2004/18 contracting authorities ‘shall treat economic operators equally and
non-discriminatorily and shall act in a transparent way’. Article 26 provides that:
Contracting authorities may lay down special conditions relating to the
performance of a contract, provided that these are compatible with [Union]
law and are indicated in the contract notice or in the specifications. The
207. Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement, and
Legal Change 3 (Oxford 2007). In EU law, ‘public procurement’ is defined as ‘the
acquisition by means of a public contract of works, supplies or services by one or more
contracting authorities from economic operators chosen by those contracting authorities,
whether or not the works, supplies or services are intended for a public purpose’:
Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65–242,
Art. 1(2).
208. European Commission, ‘Public Procurement’: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-mar
ket/public-procurement_en. See further, Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds), Social
and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law (Cambridge 2009).
209. Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on
the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply
contracts and public service contracts OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, 114–240. For detailed
analysis, see Catherine Barnard, Using Procurement Law to Enforce Labour Standards in
Guy Davidov and Brian Langille (eds), The Idea of Labour Law, 256 (Oxford 2011).
210. Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65–242.
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conditions governing the performance of a contract may, in particular,
concern social and environmental considerations.
This provision has now been replaced by Article 70 of Directive 2014/24
which has been amended to specifically include, inter alia, ‘employment related
considerations’ in the final sentence. As Éric Van den Abeele has noted, Article
26 (now Article 70) is part of a framework designed ‘to integrate strong social
and environmental dimensions and include provisions favourable to employ-
ment in the public procurement rules’.211 Article 26 was relied on by German
public authorities in two cases: Bundesruckerei212 and RegioPost.213
The context of Bundesruckerei was as follows. In 2012, the Land of North
Rhine-Westphalia introduced a law on compliance with collective agreements,
social norms and fair competition in the award of public contracts. This law fell
within the third category of responses to Rüffert identified by Sack, above.214 It
distinguished between, inter alia, those public service contracts within the scope
of the application of the law on posted workers, which essentially replicated the
‘hard core’ terms and conditions in the PWD, and other public contracts, not
covered by the posted workers law, which could only be awarded to undertak-
ings which, at the time of submission of the tender, had agreed in writing to pay
their workers EUR 8.62 as a minimum hourly wage for the performance of the
service. The Land Rhine-Westphalian law, specifically the minimum wage rate,
was applied by the City of Dortmund as a condition in a call for tenders for a
public contract relating to data services for urban planning. The value of the
contract, at EUR 300,000, brought the tender within the scope of Directive
2004/18 which covers higher value contracts. This means that under the EU
public procurement regime, the tender must be advertised throughout the EU so
as to guarantee that economic operators in the EU and the European Economic
Area will be given genuine and equal opportunities to take part.215
Bundesruckerei, a German company, informed the City of Dortmund that,
if it was awarded the contract, it would use a wholly owned subsidiary
established in Poland as subcontractor. It would pay a lower wage to the workers
in Poland in the light of the standard of living in that Member State. It was
therefore seeking an assurance that the stipulated minimum wage would not
apply to its subcontractor. The City of Dortmund was unable to give this
assurance because it was bound by the Rhine-Westphalian law. Bundesruckerei
brought a legal challenge against the City of Dortmund claiming that the
211. Éric Van den Abeele, Integrating social and environmental dimensions in public procure-
ment: one small step for the internal market, one giant leap for the EU? European Trade
Union Institute Working Paper 2014.08.
212. Case C-549/13 Bundesruckerei GmbH v. Stadt Dortmund, EU:C:2014:2235.
213. Case C-115/14 RegioPost GmbH & Co KG v. Stadt Landau in der Pfalz, EU:C:2015:760.
214. Sack, supra n. 204.
215. Kerstin Ahlberg and Niklas Bruun, Public Procurement and Labour Law – Friends or Foes?
in Mia Rönnmar (ed.), Labour Law, Fundamental Rights and Social Europe, 89, 91–92
(Hart 2011).
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tendering rules constituted an unjustified restriction on its freedom to provide
services under Article 56 TFEU.216 The City of Dortmund’s defence was three-
fold. Firstly, the tender was compatible with Rüffert, as the requirement to pay
the minimum wage was in a law consistent with the first indent of Article 3(1)
of the PWD, secondly, the legislation was laid down as a ‘special condition’
relating to the performance of the contract in accordance with Article 26 of
Directive 2004/18, cited above, and, thirdly, the statutory obligation was
justified because it ensured that a reasonable wage was paid to the employees
engaged for the performance of public works, which also reduced the burden on
the social security system.217
The Court gave its judgment in September 2014. In essence, the national
court had asked whether the application of the Rhine-Westphalian law to a
subcontractor established in another Member State, having recourse exclusively
to workers employed in that State, was precluded by Article 56 TFEU. If so, the
minimum wage condition would be inapplicable.218 It also asked about the
application of the PWD but, because Bundesruckerei did not intend to perform
the contract by posting the employees of its Polish subcontractor in German
territory, the Court found that it was not a situation covered by one of the three
transnational measures referred to in Article 1(3) of the PWD and therefore the
Directive was not applicable.219
Turning to Article 26 of Directive 2004/18, the Court emphasised that, with
reference to the language in that provision, any ‘social considerations’ relating to
the performance of the contract could only be imposed as requirements, within
the meaning of that provision, if they were ‘compatible’ with EU law. Once
again, as EU public procurement law is based on single market objectives, the
main reference point is free movement of services under Article 56 TFEU and
also competition law.
The Court treated the situation as analogous to Rüffert. Applying the test
laid down in that case, as the tenderer intended to carry out the work using
subcontractors established in a Member State other than that to which the
contracting authority belongs and in which minimum rates of pay were lower,
this requirement ‘constituted an additional economic burden that may prohibit,
impede or render less attractive the provision of their services in the host
Member State’ and was, therefore, a restriction within the meaning of Article 56
TFEU.220 Likewise, although such a measure might be justified in principle by
the objective of protecting employees and also avoiding social dumping, the
legislation of Land Rhine-Westphalia, applicable solely to public contracts, was
not backed up by information ‘to suggest that employees in the private sector are
not in need of the samewage protection as those working in the context of public
216. Bundesruckerei, para. 13.
217. Bundesruckerei, para. 14.
218. Bundesruckerei, para. 29.
219. Bundesruckerei, para. 27.
220. Bundesruckerei, para. 30, applying Rüffert (n. 184), para. 37.
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contracts’.221 Also, in so far as the scope of the national legislation could extend
to this situation, in which the contract was being performed in another Member
State, the fact that wages were lower than in Poland, made the minimum wage
requirement disproportionate.222 It bore no relation to the cost of living in Poland
and therefore prevented subcontractors established there ‘from deriving a
competitive advantage from the differences between the respective rates of pay,
that national legislation goes beyond what is necessary to ensure that the
objective of employee protection is attained’.223 Finally, the objective of stability
of social security systems could not be used to justify the minimum wage
requirement because, again analogous to Rüffert, if the Polish workers did not
receive a reasonable wage and needed to have recourse to social security, ‘it
would be to the Polish social assistance that they would have a right’, which
would not affect the German social security system.224 It followed that the
requirement in the tender was precluded by Article 56 TFEU225 and, therefore, as
it was incompatible with Union law, Article 26 of Directive 2004/18 was
inapplicable.
Bundesruckerei is a case of posting in reverse with consequences that are in
many respects evenmore negative for labour law than Rüffert. Labour, under the
type of outsourcing proposed by the tenderers, is deterritorialised not by posting,
in this instance, but by use of a subsidiary established in another Member State
to shift the workspace to a national regulatory regime with lower wages. As a
result, the contract compliance provisions have the reverse effect to that
intended by national law. Rival tenderers proposing to use workers based in the
national territory of the public procuring authority, are placed at a competitive
disadvantage as they are bound by the minimum wage requirement under
national law and therefore have higher costs. As the core principle of awarding
contracts under Directive 2004/18 was to ‘treat economic operators equally and
non-discriminatorily and … act in a transparent way’,226 it was extremely
difficult for those rival tenderers to compete unless they too decided to use
subcontractors established in Member States with lower costs. The effect is a
kind of circular dumping of labour standards that leads to a general levelling
down of wages and other terms and conditions of employment. Rüffert and
Bundesruckerei, left unchecked, would create a climate of unfair competition
wholly contrary to the social objectives of the EU directives under discussion.
There is no doubt that this case law was influential in persuading the EU
institutions to amend the principles of awarding contracts in Directive 2014/24,
discussed below.
221. Bundesruckerei, paras 31–32, applying Rüffert (n. 184), paras 38–40.
222. Bundesruckerei, para. 33.
223. Bundesruckerei, para. 34.
224. Bundesruckerei, para. 35, applying, by analogy, Rüffert (n184), para. 42.
225. Bundesruckerei, para. 36.
226. Directive 2014/24, Art. 18(1).
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The most recent case, RegioPost,227 decided just over twelve months later,
in November 2015, is an antidote to Rüffert and Bundesruckerei, and represents
a significant shift in the Court’s jurisprudence. The dispute arose after the town
of Landau, situated in the Land of Rhineland-Palatinate, launched an EU-wide
call for tenders for a public procurement contract for postal services in the
municipality. Tenderers had to comply with a Rhineland-Palatinate law requir-
ing them to guarantee a minimum wage of EUR 8.70 per hour when awarding
public contracts. Specifically, when submitting the tender documents, enter-
prises were expected to present declarations that they and their subcontractors
would pay the stipulated minimum wage. Unless the declarations were submit-
ted the tender would be excluded from the evaluation. RegioPost did not submit
a declaration with its tender, even after a reminder, but declarations by its
subcontractors were submitted. When Landau refused to evaluate its tender for
want of the declaration, RegioPost challenged the decision leading ultimately to
a judicial referral to the Court.
In essence, the main question for the Court was whether, in a procedure for
the award of a public procurement contract, tenderers and their subcontractors
could be lawfully required to undertake to pay the statutory minimum hourly
wage to the personnel who would be performing the work under that con-
tract?228 Reference was made to both Article 56 TFEU and the PWD, and also the
fact that there was neither a national minimum wage, at the time of the case, nor
a universally applicable collective agreement. The Court also asked whether, if
the condition to pay the minimum wage met the requirements of Article 26 of
Directive 2004/18, and was compatible with EU law, the tenderers would
automatically be bound to pay that minimum wage rendering the declarations
superfluous. Although the case might appear, at face value, to be fully covered
by the Rüffert, Bundesruckerei line of case law, the referring court referred to the
lively academic debate in Germany, which focused on the restrictive approach of
the Court in those cases and the possibilities for refining the law at federal state
level in a fashion that required payment of the applicable minimum wage as a
condition for tendering to perform public contracts, in line with Article 26, and
in conformity with ‘hard core’ of the PWD. In effect the Court was being asked
to think again.
The Court found, as an initial point, that the case was admissible even
though all the tenderers were established in Germany. The fact that Directive
2004/18 was applicable to the tender in this case meant that a question of
interpretation of Article 26 was admissible. There was a cross-border interest
because the value of the contract exceeded the threshold for the application of
Directive 2004/18. An undertaking established in another Member State might
have been deterred from submitting a tender by the requirement to undertake to
227. Case C-115/14 RegioPost GmbH & Co KG v. Stadt Landau in der Pfalz, EU:C:2015:760.
228. RegioPost, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, EU:C:2015:566, para. 1.
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pay the minimum wage set by the Land Rhineland-Palatinate because of lower
prevailing wage levels in that Member State.229
Addressing the main question, the Court found that the minimum wage
requirement was a ‘special condition’ concerning ‘social considerations’ for the
purposes of Article 26 and its publication satisfied the procedural condition of
transparency.230 It was also neither directly or indirectly discriminatory.231 In an
important shift from its approach in Bundesruckerei, where the Court had
considered Article 26 mainly in isolation from Directive 2004/18 as a whole, the
Court ruled that where a national measure falls within a field ‘exhaustively
harmonised at EU level’, in line with settled-case law, it ‘must be assessed … in
the light of the provisions of that harmonising measure and not in the light of the
primary law of the European Union’.232 However, because under Article 26
‘special conditions’ must be ‘compatible’ with EU law, the rules relating to that
provision were not exhaustively enumerated and it was necessary also to
consider the compatibility of the measure with primary law and other EU
measures.233 In particular, the measure had to be compatible with the minimum
conditions laid down in the PWD, a requirement drawn from recital 34 of the
preamble of Directive 2004/18,234 directly linking the two provisions. Because,
hypothetically, an undertaking established in another Member State, with a
lower standard of living and a lower minimum wage in the sector, may have
been interested in submitting a tender for the contract and envisaged posting
workers to Germany, and such an undertaking might have been deterred by the
minimum wage requirement, it was necessary to examine the national measure
in the light of Article 3(1) of the PWD.235
With regard to the PWD, the Court distinguished Rüffert on the facts.
Firstly, unlike the Law of Lower Saxony in that case, the Law of Rhineland-
Palatinate laid down the minimum rate of pay bringing it within the first indent
of Article 3(1) and also Article 3(1)(c), and secondly, at the time of the case,
which was before Germany had introduced a national minimum wage law,
national legislation did not impose a lower rate for the postal services sector.236
Another important point of distinction was that the second indent concerning
the requirement for collective agreements to be universally applicable was not
relevant because this was not a contract for building works falling within that
indent. As this condition did not apply, Article 3(8) was not relevant and
categorisation of the Rhineland-Palatinate law under the first indent ‘cannot be
called into question on the basis that [it applied] to public contracts and not to
229. RegioPost, para. 51.
230. RegioPost, paras 54–55.
231. RegioPost, para. 56, referencing recital 33 of the preamble of Directive 2004/18.
232. RegioPost, para. 57, and the cases cited therein.
233. RegioPost, paras 58–59.
234. RegioPost, para. 60.
235. RegioPost, para. 61, cf Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi’s Opinion, paras 51–59.
236. RegioPost, para. 62.
Chapter 12: The Enterprise, Labour and the Court of Justice
239
private contracts’.237 Moreover, once again linking the PWD with Article 26 of
Directive 2004/18, the Court added that, the national measure fell within the
latter provision, ‘which permits, subject to certain conditions, the imposition of
a minimum wage in public contracts [and] that measure cannot be required to
extend beyond that specified field by applying generally to all contracts,
including private contracts’.238 The Court concisely drove home the point by
adding that the limitation of the scope of the measure to public contracts was
‘the simple consequence of the fact that there are rules of EU law specific to that
field, in this case, those laid down in Directive 2004/18’. In one bound, by firstly
identifying this vital linkage between the directives and, secondly, giving
precedence to the public procurement rules, based on the facts of the case, the
Court was able to break free from the straightjacket it had imposed on itself in
Rüffert.
The effect is to turn Rüffert on its head in cases where Article 26 (now
Article 70 of Directive 2014/24) applies, thus:239
It follows that Article 26 of Directive 2004/18, read in conjunction with
Directive 96/71, permits the host Member State to lay down, in the context of
the award of a public contract, a mandatory rule for minimum protection
referred to in point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that
directive, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which requires
undertakings established in other Member States to comply with an obligation
in respect of a minimum rate of pay for the benefit of their workers posted to
the territory of the host Member State in order to perform that public contract.
Such a rule is part of the level of protection which must be guaranteed to those
workers.
Most significantly, in complete contrast to Laval, Commission v. Luxem-
bourg, Rüffert and Bundesruckerei, in this specific instance, the rule prohibiting
restrictions on the freedom to provide services in Article 56 TFEU, so often a
negative from a labour law perspective, becomes more of a neutral factor. As the
Court explains, Article 26 is to be read in the light of Article 56 TFEU ‘since that
directive [seeks] in particular to bring about the freedom to provide services’.240
Viewed through this prism, although a minimum wage requirement in the
context of an EU-level public procurement contract is ‘capable’ of constituting a
restriction on the freedom to provide services, such a measure may, in principle,
be justified by the objective of protecting workers.241 Again, Rüffert could be
distinguished. Even though Rüffert had appeared to rule out minimum wage
rules relating solely to public contracts,242 in that case what was at issue was a
collective agreement applying solely to the construction sector that had not been
237. RegioPost, para. 63.
238. RegioPost, para. 64.
239. RegioPost, para. 66, also applying language from Laval (n. 133), paras 74, 80 and 81.
240. RegioPost, para. 67.
241. RegioPost, paras 69–70.
242. RegioPost, para. 71, referring to Rüffert (n. 184), paras 38–40, discussed in the previous
section.
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declared universally applicable.243 By contrast, in RegioPost, the Rhineland-
Palatinate law on the minimum wage was ‘a mandatory rule for minimum
protection’ that applied irrespective of the sector concerned and no other
legislation, at the time, imposed a lower minimum wage for the postal sector.
This was sufficient, in the context of the application of Article 26, to justify the
measure.244
In briefly answering the second question in the reference, concerning the
lawfulness of the declaration that Regiopost was required to sign, the Court
found that such a requirement was not precluded in the light of its answer to the
previous question.245 Once again the Court turned a possible negative into a
positive from a labour law perspective. Exclusion from the evaluation for failing
to supply the declaration was not a penalty, it was simply a failure to meet a
requirement. Moreover, such a method was formulated ‘in a particularly trans-
parent manner’ in the contract notice so as ‘to emphasise, from the outset, the
importance of compliance with a mandatory rule for minimum protection
expressly authorised by Article 26 of Directive 2004/18’.246 It followed that
Article 26 permitted such an exclusion which was appropriate and proportion-
ate.247
After so many setbacks, Regiopost has been heralded as a belated stance by
the Court against social dumping.248 Albert Sanchez-Graells observes that the
Court has ‘back-tracked’ from its restrictive line of case law on the use of public
procurement for social policy purposes but expresses concern that the judgment
amounts to ‘economic protectionism’ and facilitates ‘the politicised use of public
procurement’.249 In my view, however, the Court has merely addressed an
imbalance between the economic and the social dimensions of EU single market
law. In certain, strictly circumscribed, situations it is possible to justify mini-
mum wage requirements and other terms and conditions of employment in the
tendering of higher value public contracts falling within the scope of the EU’s
public procurement regime so long as requirements applicable to posted workers
are compatible with the PWD. Rüffert remains in place and continues to limit
243. RegioPost, para. 73.
244. RegioPost, paras 75–77.
245. RegioPost, para. 79.
246. RegioPost, para. 83.
247. RegioPost, paras 84–5 and 87–88, with reference to recital 34 in the preamble of Directive
2004/18 which allows for exclusion in such circumstances. The Court added, at para. 86,
that the declaration imposed a ‘negligible’ burden on tenderers and their subcontractors.
248. See Daniel William Carter, ‘CJEU (finally) takes stance against social dumping’, Leiden
Law Blog, 19 February 2016: http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/cjeu-finally-takes-stance-
against-social-dumping.
249. Albert Sanchez-Graells, CJEU clarifies and minimises Rüffert, and expands the scope for
minimum wage requirements in public procurement (C-115/14), How to Crack a Nut: A
Blog on EU Economic law, 17 November 2015: http://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/
2015/11/cjeu-clarifies-and-minimises-ruffert.html.
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measures that have an impact on posted workers in situations where either the
public procurement rules are not applicable or laws or collective agreements do
not satisfy the requirements in the Directive. In particular, the Court’s test for
universal applicability of collective agreements remains intact and would have
rendered the type of minimumwage requirement relied on in RegioPost unlawful
if the town had applied it to a construction contract.
12.3.3 Ways Forward
As the case law analysis has shown, the orientation of law on posted workers is
single market law ahead of labour law, and the purpose of EU regulation is to
coordinate rather than harmonise national laws. From the outset, therefore, any
measure of national labour law seeking to regulate the posting of workers, or
potentially impacting on them, must not infringe the principle of free movement
of services. In practice this has led to a case by case rear guard action to defend
the core principles and methodology of national labour laws that form part of the
fabric of European social solidarity. The terms and conditions of employment in
the PWD are perceived by the Court not as a reference point for upwards
harmonisation, as would be the norm for social policy directives, but, instead, as
an exhaustive list of rules providing a ceiling of minimum protection for posted
workers who, outside of the free movement of workers’ regime,250 are only
deserving of more favourable provisions in the host Member State when they
already enjoy higher standards of employment protection in their home Member
State. Preventing social dumping, which was the driving force for many Member
States supporting the PWD, has been, in practice, a largely unsuccessful basis for
objective justification of national rules, with the exception of RegioPost,251 where
the EU public procurement regime was the point of reference.
Laval,252 Commission v. Luxembourg,253 Rüffert,254 and Bundesruckerei255
highlight the extent of the squeeze placed by the Court on some of basic tenets
of labour law in this context, including the right to take collective action, policies
to ensure equality of treatment in employment contracts, and social clauses in
public works contracts. Following Rüffert, and in response to widespread
concern about the need to promote socially responsible public procurement,256
250. TFEU, Art. 45.
251. Case C-115/14 RegioPost GmbH & Co KG v. Stadt Landau in der Pfalz, EU:C:2015:760.
252. Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet,
EU:C:2007:809.
253. Case C-319/06 Commission v. Luxembourg, EU:C:2008:350.
254. Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, EU:C:2008:189.
255. Case C-549/13 Bundesruckerei GmbH v. Stadt Dortmund, EU:C:2014:2235.
256. See European Commission, Buying Social: A Guide to Taking Account of Social Consid-
erations in Public Procurement, Staff Working Paper (SEC)2010 1258 final, 7. For
discussion see Koukiadaki, supra n. 200, at 92.
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the rules have been strengthened in Directive 2014/24.257 In particular, environ-
mental, social and labour considerations now form part of the principles of
public procurement, as follows:258
Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that in the perfor-
mance of public contracts economic operators comply with applicable obli-
gations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law established by
Union law, national law, collective agreements or by the international envi-
ronmental, social and labour law provisions listed in Annex X.
This provision, Article 18(2), has the effect of introducing a general
obligation to comply with national, EU and international labour law. Annex X
refers to the fundamental labour law conventions of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO).259 This is an important reference point as the ILO has been
at the forefront of fostering the incorporation of social objectives into public
procurement by seeking respect for minimum labour standards and seeking ‘to
ensure that public contracts do not exert a downward pressure on wages and
working conditions’.260
Two paragraphs in the recitals add teeth to this provision. First, Recital 37
states, in reference to the scope of Article 18(2), and in the context of the PWD,
as follows:
With a view to an appropriate integration of environmental, social and labour
requirements into public procurement procedures it is of particular impor-
tance that Member States and contracting authorities take relevant measures
to ensure compliance with obligations in the fields of environmental, social
and labour law that apply at the place where the works are executed or the
services provided and result from laws, regulations, decrees and decisions, at
both national and Union level, as well as from collective agreements, provided
that such rules, and their application, comply with Union law. Equally,
obligations stemming from international agreements ratified by all Member
States and listed in Annex X should apply during contract performance.
However, this should in no way prevent the application of terms and
conditions of employment which are more favourable to workers.
The relevant measures should be applied in conformity with the basic
principles of Union law, in particular with a view to ensuring equal treatment.
Such relevant measures should be applied in accordance with Directive
96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and in a way that
ensures equal treatment and does not discriminate directly or indirectly
against economic operators and workers from other Member States.
257. Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65–242.
258. Ibid. Art. 18(2).
259. Ibid. Annex X lists the eight fundamental ILO Conventions: http://www.ilo.org/global/
standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-recommend
ations/lang--en/index.htm.
260. ILO, Labour Clauses in Public Contracts: Integrating the Social Dimension into Procure-
ment Policies and Practices (ILO 2008). See ILO Convention No. 94 of 1949 on Labour
Clauses (Public Contracts). For discussion see Koukiadaki, supra n. 200, at 92.
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This recital provides clarification of the application of the obligation in
Article 18(2) at both national and Union level. However, where the PWD is the
main frame of reference, as in Rüffert,261 it is doubtful whether it will lead to any
fundamental change in the law.
Also, Recital 39 provides a strong statement on the status of collective
agreements as follows:
It should also be possible to include clauses ensuring compliance with
collective agreements in compliance with Union law in public contracts.
Non-compliance with the relevant obligations could be considered to be grave
misconduct on the part of the economic operator concerned, liable to exclu-
sion of that economic operator from the procedure for the award of a public
contract.
This clause adds weight to the interpretation of the previous Directive,
2004/18, in RegioPost.262 Once again, however, it does not completely rule out a
situation, such as in Rüffert,263 where a restrictive interpretation of the PWD is
the overriding issue on the facts. However, if both the PWD and Directive
2014/24 are in play, it is submitted that RegioPost is reinforced and is the
preferred case to follow.
In response to widespread concerns about the inadequacy of the PWD as a
mechanism to combat social dumping, and a growing awareness that the law
needs to be improved,264 the Commission published a ‘targeted revision’ of the
Directive in March 2016.265 One factor driving reform is an increase in postings
in the EU. In 2014 there were over 1.9 million workers posted to perform service
contracts amounting to 0.7% of the total EU labour force, representing increases
of 10.3% on 2013 and 44.4% from 2010.
The Commission notes that some improvements will be achieved by means
of the Enforcement Directive, 2014/67,266 which reached its transposition date in
June 2016. The Enforcement Directive is mainly concerned with improved
administrative cooperation between national authorities in charge of posting
and strengthening monitoring mechanisms at national level. It only addresses
problems relating to the implementation of existing rules. It does, however,
highlight the issue of so-called ‘letter-box’ companies that are created inMember
261. Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, EU:C:2008:189.
262. Case C-115/14 RegioPost GmbH & Co KG v. Stadt Landau in der Pfalz, EU:C:2015:760.
263. Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, EU:C:2008:189.
264. European Parliament, supra n. 115, at 9.
265. European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Directive 96/71/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of
16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision
of services’, COM(2016) 128 final, 8 March 2016.
266. Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on
the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the
framework of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2012 on
administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI
Regulation’), OJ L 159, 28.5.2014, 11–31.
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States where labour costs are low.267 Once established, these companies carry
out little or no activity in their home country, because their main purpose is to
post workers to other Member States and pay less in social security contribu-
tions. Under Article 4(2) of the Enforcement Directive, a series of factors can be
used to determine whether an undertaking genuinely performs substantial
activities, other than purely internal management and/or administrative activi-
ties. For example, this can be done by identifying: the place where the under-
taking performs its substantial business activity and where it employs adminis-
trative staff; and the number of contracts performed and the size of the turnover.
The revision of the PWD would maintain its orientation as a single market
measure and does not harmonise labour costs.268 The main proposed changes
are as follows:
– when the anticipated or effective duration of the posting exceeds
twenty-four months, the host Member State will be deemed to be the
country where the work is habitually carried out. The law of the host
Member State will apply to the employment contract of these long-term
posted workers if no other choice of law was made by the parties;269
– it removes the Annex concerning building work. This has the effect of
making collective agreements capable of being ‘universally applicable’
to posted workers in all sectors of the economy;270
– it replaces the reference to ‘minimum rates of pay’ with ‘remuneration’.
It is left to all Member States to apply rules on remuneration in
accordance with their national law and practice;271
– a new subparagraph is added to the listing of the mandatory rules
placing an obligation on Member States to publish information on the
constituent elements of remuneration;272
– a new provision concerning subcontracting chains. Member States will
be permitted, subject to the principle of proportionality, to oblige
undertakings to subcontract only to undertakings that grant workers
certain conditions on remuneration applicable to the contractor, includ-
ing those resulting from non-universally applicable collective agree-
ments.273 The same obligations must be imposed on all national subcon-
tractors;
267. European Parliament, supra n. 115, at 39.
268. COM(2016) 128, 4.
269. Ibid. Art. 2a(1). Under Art. 2a(2): ‘in case of replacement of posted workers performing
the same task at the same place, the cumulative duration of the posting periods of the
workers shall be taken into account, with regard to workers that are posted for an
effective duration of at least six months’.
270. Ibid. first indent of Art. 3(a)(1). The term ‘universally applicable’ continues to be
interpreted in line with Art. 3(8).
271. Ibid. Art. 3(a)(1)(c).
272. Ibid. Art. 3(a), second subparagraph.
273. Ibid. Art. 3(b).
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– temporary posted workers are guaranteed the terms and conditions
provided for in the Temporary Agency Work Directive, 2008/104.274
These proposals, if implemented, would amount to a significant improve-
ment in the law concerning posted workers. The proposed Directive would
effectively provide for equality of treatment under national law for long-term
posted workers. However, these long-term posted workers will continue to be in
a rather anomalous position as service providers rather than ‘workers’ with full
EU citizenship rights. Further strengthening of protection would come with the
provisions on subcontracting and temporary posted workers, although there is a
danger that, where it is feasible, more enterprises will resort to carrying out the
performance of the service contract in the home Member State of the workers
and thereby avoid the PWD, as in Bundesruckerei.275
Most contentious is the amendment to change ‘minimum rates of pay’ to
‘remuneration’ in the mandatory rules. ‘Remuneration’ is defined as ‘all the
elements of remuneration rendered mandatory by national law’. It is broadly in
line with ESA,276 the Finnish case, briefly discussed above, where a collective
agreement with detailed rules on remuneration was found to be universally
applicable and, therefore, within the scope of the PWD.277
The prospects for agreement on the revised PWD, on the basis of the
content proposed by the Commission, do not look promising. In the Explanatory
Memorandum accompanying the proposal, it is made evident that there is a clear
split between countries receiving posted workers – seven Member States in
northern Europe,278 supporting ‘modernisation’ of the PWD; and countries
exporting posted workers – nine Member States in central and Eastern Eu-
rope,279 who argue that a review of the PWD is premature.280 In the summer of
2016, the Commission was required to reconsider its proposal after receiving
objections in reasoned opinions from parliaments in eleven Member States.281
Under the so-called ‘yellow card’ procedure,282 the Commission has been
warned that, in the reasoned opinion of this group of national parliaments, the
proposal is not compatible with the principle of subsidiarity,283 as action can be
274. Ibid. Art. 3(c). See Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work, OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, 9–14, Art. 5.
275. Case C-549/13 Bundesruckerei GmbH v. Stadt Dortmund, EU:C:2014:2235.
276. Case C-396/13 Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry v. Elektrobudowa Spolka Akcyjna (ESA),
EU:C:2015:86.
277. For further analysis of Directive 2014/24, see Van den Abeele, supra n. 211.
278. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden.
279. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and
Romania.
280. European Commission (n. 265) 4–5.
281. In addition to several of the countries referred to above, n. 279, the list of objectors
included the parliaments of Denmark and Croatia. See European Commission,
COM(2016) 505 final.
282. Protocol 2 annexed to the treaties.
283. TEU, Art. 5(3).
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taken at Member State level to secure the EU’s objectives. Having analysed all of
the objections, the Commission has resolutely concluded that action at Union
level is necessary.284 It will proceed with the proposal but it faces a difficult
hurdle to secure sufficient support in the Council of the EU where a qualified
majority vote is required among the Member States for the measure to be
adopted.
12.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Analysis of the Court’s case law on collective redundancies, posted workers and
public procurement has demonstrated that EU labour law and social provisions
in single market law, originally designed to provide a modicum of protection to
workers in specific employment situations, including in contexts such as
transnational restructuring and subcontracting, is no long effective in securing
those objectives. EU legislation, enacted in the twentieth century, has been
interpreted inflexibly by the Court, in its desire to preserve an autonomous EU
interpretation of core concepts, in twenty-first century cases involving complex
transnational restructuring, major insolvencies, and ‘downsizing’ by closing
smaller units of the enterprise. Moreover, EU single market law has accelerated
the pace of globalisation, especially in services, opening up opportunities for
enterprises to deterritorialise their activities, by establishing subsidiaries, sub-
contracting, outsourcing and posting workers to perform service contracts in
other Member States. In turn, this has brought about institutional changes in
transnational workspaces,285 leading to an increasing fragmentation of labour,
and gaps in employment and social protection.
As the EU has expanded territorially, inequalities in both labour conditions
and social security between Member States have widened rather than closed,
reviving the problem of social dumping that EU social policy was designed to
cure by means of partial harmonisation, where necessary, to achieve a ‘gradual
coalescence of social policies’ as a consequence of market integration.286 The
challenge for the EU is to reform the law to adapt to regulatory competition and
transformational changes in the organisation of enterprises in the single market
because, as Simon Deakin has observed ‘outcomes are critically dependent on
the way in which the rules of the game are designed’.287
284. European Commission, COM(2016) 505 final.
285. See Wagner, supra n. 4.
286. See Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour Law and Social Security, in E. Stein and T. L. Nicholson
(eds), American Enterprise in the European Common Market. A Legal Profile, 297, 299
(University of Michigan Press 1960). Kahn-Freund was discussing the ‘Spaak Report’:
High Authority of the European Community for Coal and Steel, ‘The Brussels Report on
the General Common Market’, June 1956 http://aei.pitt.edu/995/1/Spaak_report.pdf.
See further, Stefano Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European
Constitution: A Labour Law Perspective, 45–49 (Cambridge 2006).
287. S. Deakin, supra n. 5, at 1.
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